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WHAT IS ANIMAL LAW? 
JERROLD TANNENBAUM* 
ABSTRACT 
This Article considers a critically important issue facing the new field of 
animal law: how to define animal law itself. Two sharply different general 
approaches to defining the area currently vie for support. One defines 
animal law as committed to advocacy on behalf of animals, including, for 
many proponents of this approach, promotion of animal rights. The 
competing approach defines animal law in a purely descriptive manner, as 
(roughly) the area of law that relates to animals, whatever substantive 
principles regarding animals the law may adopt. The Article demonstrates 
that advocacy-oriented definitions violate fundamental standards of 
definition and conflict with crucial aims and values of our legal system. 
The discussion argues in favor of descriptive definition of animal law, but 
explains why such a definition may be difficult to formulate. The Article 
maintains that a necessary first step in finding a satisfactory definition—
and in motivating lawyers, law school faculty, and law students to pay 
sufficient attention to animal-related legal issues—is rejection of 
advocacy-oriented definitions of animal law. 
 I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................... 894	  
 II. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS .......................................... 895	  
A. Infrequency of Formal Definitions of Animal Law ...... 895	  
B. Agreement about the Meaning of the Term “Animal” 896	  
 III. ADVOCACY-ORIENTED DEFINITION OF ANIMAL LAW ......... 896	  
A. Rights-Centered Advocacy Definition ......................... 896	  
1. Representative Examples ..................................... 896	  
2. Definitional Elements and Compatible Claims .... 901	  
B. Reformist Advocacy Definition .................................... 902	  
 IV. EMERGENCE AND EARLY DOMINANCE OF RIGHTS-CENTERED 
DEFINITION ...................................................................................... 906	  
A. Necessary Conditions of an Area of Animal Law: Content, 
Connections, and Interest ............................................................... 906	  
B. The Long History of Law Relating to Animals ............ 907	  
                                                            
* Professor of Veterinary and Animal Ethics and Law, School of Veterinary Medicine, and 
Visiting Professor, School of Law, University of California at Davis (King Hall). J.D., 
Harvard Law School; B.A. and M.A. (Philosophy), Cornell University. I would like to thank 
Zachary Colbeth, King Hall Class of 2013, for invaluable research and editorial assistance. I 
am deeply grateful to the King Hall students who have taken my animal law course since 
2003, from whom I have learned so much, and without whom the article could not have been 
written. By their large numbers, diverse perspectives, and enthusiastic interest in all points of 
view, they have confirmed the wisdom of attempting to define animal law in the manner urged 
in the article. 
1Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2013
892 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:891 
 
C. Connections among Legal Principles Relating to Animals 
   ..................................................................................... 908	  
D. Interest of Animal Advocates in Recognizing “Animal 
Law”   ..................................................................................... 908	  
E. Animal Rights Theory as a Motivating and Unifying 
Factor   ..................................................................................... 910	  
F. Adoption of Rights-Centered Definition by Observers and 
Opponents of the Animal Rights Movement .................................... 912	  
 V. EMERGENCE OF DESCRIPTIVE DEFINITIONS OF “ANIMAL LAW” 
  914	  
 VI. SOME GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF DEFINITION ........................ 917	  
A. Components and Nature of Definitions ....................... 917	  
B. Definition versus Factual Descriptions or Ethical 
Conclusions ..................................................................................... 919	  
C. Limited Role of Definitions .......................................... 919	  
D. Purposes of Definitions ............................................... 920	  
1. Interrelation of Definitional Purpose and Content 920	  
2. Lexical and Stipulative Definitions ...................... 920	  
E. Analytic Definition and its Limitations ........................ 921	  
F. Impossibility of Defining Some Words ........................ 923	  
 VII. APPLICATION OF PRINCIPLES OF DEFINITION BY DEFINITIONS OF 
AREAS OF LAW ................................................................................ 924	  
A. The Definitions of Most Areas of Law Include or Imply 
Very Little about These Areas’ Current Basic Concepts, Causes of 
Action, and Substantive Principles ................................................. 924	  
B. The Definitions of Areas of Law Typically Include or 
Imply Very Little about What Substantive Principles These Areas 
Ought to Endorse ............................................................................ 926	  
C. The Definitions of Areas of Law Typically Include or 
Imply Very Little About the Underlying Fundamental Goals and 
Structure of These Areas ................................................................. 927	  
D. Some Areas of Law Are Not Susceptible to Analytic 
Definition  ..................................................................................... 928	  
E. Not Every Area of Law May be Capable of Definition 929	  
 VIII. FOLLOWING STANDARDS OF GOOD DEFINITION FURTHERS 
CENTRAL AIMS AND VALUES OF SPECIFIC AREAS OF LAW AND THE 
LEGAL SYSTEM IN GENERAL ........................................................... 930	  
A. Flexibility, Adaptability, and Ability to Change .......... 930	  
B. Openness to Empirical and Normative Argument and 
Competing Theories of Law ............................................................ 931	  
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol61/iss4/4
2013] WHAT IS ANIMAL LAW? 893 
 
C. Application of Principles Involving Multiple Areas of Law
   ..................................................................................... 931	  
D. Commitment to the Adversarial Process ..................... 931	  
1. Most Definitions of Areas of Law Do Not Target 
Particular Parties for Protection ...................................................... 931	  
2. Definitions of Areas of Law That Do Target Kinds of 
Parties for Protection Do Not Impede the Ability of Opposing 
Attorneys to Argue on Behalf of Their Clients ............................... 932	  
 IX. WHY ADVOCACY DEFINITIONS OF ANIMAL LAW SHOULD BE 
REJECTED ........................................................................................ 933	  
A. Rights-Centered Advocacy Definition Does Not Define an 
Area of Law ..................................................................................... 934	  
B. Rights-Centered Definition Will Likely Never Define an 
Area of Law ..................................................................................... 934	  
C. Rights-Centered Definition Would Exclude Many Animals 
from the Purview of Animal Law .................................................... 935	  
D. Rights-Centered Definition Violates Principles of Good 
Definition  ..................................................................................... 936	  
1. Endorsement of Empirical and Normative 
Propositions and Substantive Legal Principles ............................... 936	  
2. Impeding Professional Development of Lawyers and 
Effective Representation of Clients ................................................ 938	  
3. Reducing Potential Enrollments in Animal Law 
Courses and Attention to Animal Law by Law School Faculty ..... 938	  
E. Identical Flaws of Reformist Advocacy Definition ...... 942	  
 X. VIRTUES AND CHALLENGES OF DESCRIPTIVE DEFINITION OF 
ANIMAL LAW ................................................................................... 943	  
A. Apparent Advantages of Descriptive Definition .......... 943	  
B. Potential Impediments to Formulating a Satisfactory 
Descriptive Definition ..................................................................... 944	  
1. An Analytic Definition Is Not Required .............. 944	  
2. Existence of a Distinct Area of Law Capable of 
Definition Is Required .................................................................... 944	  
C. The Tasks Ahead .......................................................... 950	  
1. Attempting to Find a Satisfactory Descriptive 
Definition   .............................................................................. 950	  
2. Dealing with the Possibility That a Descriptive 
Definition Is Unachievable ............................................................. 950	  
 XI. CONCLUSION: A NECESSARY FIRST STEP ............................ 951	  
TABLE: SOME ANIMAL-RELATED LEGAL SCENARIOS ...................... 953	  
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2013
894 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:891 
 
“The only way in which a human being can make some approach to 
knowing the whole of a subject, is by hearing what can be said about it by 
persons of every variety of opinion, and studying all modes in which it 
can be looked at by every character of mind. No wise man ever acquired 
his wisdom in any mode but this; nor is it in the nature of human intellect 
to become wise in any other manner. The steady habit of correcting and 
completing his own opinion by collating it with those of others, so far 
from causing doubt and hesitation in carrying it into practice, is the only 
stable foundation for a just reliance on it: for, being cognisant of all that 
can, at least obviously, be said against him, and having taken up his 
position against all gainsayers—knowing that he has sought for objections 
and difficulties, instead of avoiding them, and has shut out no light which 
can be thrown upon the subject from any quarter—he has a right to think 
his judgment better than that of any person, or any multitude, who have 
not gone through a similar process.”1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This Article considers a critically important issue facing the new field of animal 
law: how to define “animal law” itself. 2 There is at present no definition that is 
accepted generally by lawyers in the United States.3 Two sharply different 
approaches to defining animal law currently vie for support. One characterizes 
animal law as essentially and necessarily committed to advocacy on behalf of 
animals. For many proponents of this approach, such advocacy (and thus animal law 
by its very nature) includes endorsement of a number of claims of the contemporary 
animal rights movement.4 Among these claims are: that countless animals are 
wrongly exploited and abused to benefit and please humans, that ending this 
mistreatment requires fundamental changes in how the law deals with animals, and 
that among these changes is granting animals legal rights they do not yet have.5 The 
competing approach to defining animal law does not view the area as committed to 
advocacy of any kind, or to any particular substantive legal principles. This approach 
seeks to define animal law in a purely descriptive manner, as (roughly) the area of 
law that deals with or pertains to animals, whatever substantive principles regarding 
animals the law may happen to adopt.6  
The primary aim of this Article is to urge rejection of advocacy-oriented, or as I 
shall sometimes call it “advocacy,” definition of animal law. I argue that general 
                                                            
 1 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 39-40 (1859). 
 2 In the Article, I usually do not place quotation marks around the words “animal law” 
when discussing definitions of the area because doing so repeatedly can be distracting. As is 
explained in Part VI.A infra, philosophers of language counsel the use of quotation marks 
around defined terms because it is important to keep in mind that definitions are of words or 
terms, and not things. This Article considers how the term “animal law” is and should be 
defined. 
 3 See infra Parts IV, V. 
 4 See infra Part III.A. 
 5 Id. 
 6 See infra Part V. 
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adoption of this kind of definition by the legal profession will hinder the ability of 
attorneys to represent clients with animal-related legal issues, and will prevent 
adequate discussion of how the law ought to deal with animals. Although the Article 
supports the descriptive approach to defining animal law, it does not propose a final 
definition in accordance with this approach. The approach has a problem of its own: 
The many and varied ways in which the law relates to animals make it difficult to 
define animal law as an area with a coherent and distinct identity. The Article urges 
continuing discussion about how animal law might be defined descriptively. 
However, at present, formulating a satisfactory descriptive definition of animal law 
is less important than putting advocacy-oriented definitions unequivocally, 
universally, and permanently to rest. 
Part II discusses preliminary matters regarding the competing definitional 
approaches. Part III characterizes the two major variants of advocacy-oriented 
definition of animal law. Part IV explains why the variant that identifies animal law 
with animal rights law gained significant acceptance when talk of an area of “animal 
law” began in the late twentieth century. Part V describes the emergence and 
growing acceptance of descriptive definitions of animal law. Part VI presents several 
key principles relating to definition that are generally accepted in the field of the 
philosophy of language. These principles are subsequently employed to argue for 
rejection of advocacy-oriented definitions of animal law, and in assessing potential 
descriptive definitions. Parts VII and VIII discuss how and why definitions of other 
areas of law adhere to these definitional principles. Part IX demonstrates why 
advocacy definitions of animal law are unacceptable. Part X reviews the advantages 
of descriptive definition, but explains why formulating a satisfactory descriptive 
definition of animal law may prove to be difficult. Part XI concludes that rejection of 
advocacy definition is a necessary first step in advancing the legal profession’s 
ability to deal adequately with animal-related issues. 
II. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS 
A. Infrequency of Formal Definitions of Animal Law 
Discussions of animal law do not always provide explicit definitions of the area. 
Often, one must glean how authors define animal law from statements about what 
they regard as the area’s central features. It is usually obvious whether an author 
employs an advocacy-oriented or descriptive definition. However, variations within 
each of these general definitional approaches are possible, and it may sometimes be 
unclear whether a given author, if pressed to provide an explicit definition, would 
include certain specific statements.7 I shall attempt to characterize accurately and 
fairly how various authors define animal law, even when (as is usually the case) they 
do not provide explicit or clear definitions. The aim of this Article is to compare the 
two different general ways of defining animal law. Characterizations of these general 
definitional approaches will suffice if they advance this aim, even if some individual 
authors might object that I have omitted a detail they would, or added a detail they 
would not, include in a precise definitional statement. 
                                                            
 7 For example, as discussed below, although all proponents of rights-centered advocacy 
definition seek a “paradigm change” in how the law deals with animals, individual proponents 
of this type of definition may or may not include this locution in an explicit definition of 
animal law.  
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B. Agreement about the Meaning of the Term “Animal” 
There have been interesting and important disagreements regarding how the term 
“animal” is, or should be, defined in a number of legal contexts.8 However, one must 
note from the outset that proponents of advocacy-oriented and descriptive definitions 
do not talk about how in their view the term “animal” should be defined for the 
purposes of defining animal law. Proponents of the competing definitional 
approaches thus appear to agree about what animals are. Their disagreement 
concerns what role animal law, when properly defined, should have regarding 
animals. This explains why the particular advocacy-oriented and descriptive 
definitions of “animal law” discussed in this Article, like such definitions generally, 
do not include, and are not supplemented further by, statements about how the term 
“animal” should be defined. 
III. ADVOCACY-ORIENTED DEFINITION OF ANIMAL LAW 
A. Rights-Centered Advocacy Definition 
It might be possible to characterize advocacy-oriented definitions of animal law 
simply as those that include any kind of advocacy on behalf of animals as an 
essential element of animal law—without specification of what constitutes such 
advocacy or what substantive legal principles animal law is supposed to advance. 
However, this characterization would not accurately reflect the definitions employed 
by the great majority of lawyers who define animal law in terms of animal advocacy. 
There have in fact been two major types of advocacy definition of animal law, each 
of which includes more than general or indeterminate “advocacy.” The initial, and 
still predominant, form of advocacy definition has as its central feature the 
proposition that animal law seeks to establish and enforce certain fundamental legal 
rights for animals. I shall therefore call this variant of advocacy definition, “rights-
centered” advocacy definition, or sometimes more simply, “rights-centered” 
definition of animal law. 
1. Representative Examples 
In characterizing rights-centered definition, it is useful to begin with some 
examples. As is discussed later in the Article,9 including advocacy of legal rights for 
animals in the definition of animal law was first endorsed by most of the lawyers 
who persuaded a significant proportion of the legal profession to view animal law as 
a distinct legal field. Perhaps the lawyer most influential in this development was 
Joyce Tischler, who in the late 1970s organized Attorneys for Animal Rights, which 
became the current Animal Legal Defense Fund (ALDF). In a discussion of the 
history of the ALDF, Tischler describes how in 1979 she met with a group of 
attorneys who believed that animals should have legal rights. These lawyers wanted, 
                                                            
 8 For example, a number of cases have considered whether certain kinds of creatures that 
are classified biologically as “animals” are included within the meaning of the term for the 
purposes of a state’s cruelty-to-animals statutes. See, e.g., Kansas v. Claiborne, 505 P.2d 732 
(Kan. 1973) (holding that birds used in cockfights are not “animals” within the meaning of the 
state cruelty law). Contra People v. Baniqued, 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 835 (Cal. App. 3d 2000).  
 9 See infra Part IV. 
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she says, to play a role “in the newly forming animal rights movement.”10 She 
continues: 
In the twenty years since then, attorneys both in and around ALDF have 
created a new area of the law: Animal Law. They have worked to expand 
tort law concepts in order to increase the damages recoverable for an 
injury to or the death of a companion animal; applied environmental laws 
to challenge hunting, trapping and removal of wildlife from their habitat; 
tried to protect farm animals through innovative application of state 
consumer laws and challenged trapping via state anti-cruelty laws. They 
have been forced to master the highly political issue of standing to sue 
and have agonized over the problems of litigating on behalf of rightless 
beings.11  
It is possible that proponents of rights-centered advocacy-oriented definition of 
animal law believe that such definition should prevail because they think those who 
create a field are thereby entitled to define it. In any event, Tischler is correct in 
asserting that she and her colleagues viewed themselves as deliberately constructing 
a new area of law in order to advance their viewpoints and aims regarding animals. 
As the passage above indicates, among these aims was (and remains) obtaining legal 
rights for animals and opposition to many current uses of animals. In a two-part 
article chronicling what she calls the “history of animal law,” Tischler makes clear 
that in her view many animals are subjected to terrible exploitation; that establishing 
legal rights for animals is necessary to remedy this mistreatment; and that in its 
essence, animal law seeks to create and enforce these rights. Indeed, for Tischler, the 
terms “animal law” and “animal rights law” are synonymous. She describes animal 
law as  
a large-scale, organized movement, which started in the early 1970s in the 
United States, spearheaded by attorneys and law students with the express 
purpose of filing lawsuits to protect animals and establishing the concept 
of their legal rights, regardless of the species of the animals or the 
ownership interest of humans. What we now call Animal Rights Law or 
Animal Law began when attorneys consciously considered animal-related 
legal issues from the perspective of the animal’s interests, when they 
began to view the animal as the de facto client, and where the goal was to 
challenge institutionalized forms of animal abuse and exploitation.12  
Tischler frequently characterizes animal law as “animal law advocacy” and “the 
animal law movement”—and uses these terms interchangeably. For example, she 
introduces the second installment of her history of animal law as follows: 
In a prior article, I chronicled the beginnings of the animal law movement. 
In this article, I focus on the second wave of animal law advocacy, 
                                                            
 10 Joyce M. Tischler, Toward Legal Rights for Other Animals, in ANIMAL LAW: CASES 
AND MATERIALS 745, 745 (Sonia S. Waisman et al. eds., 2d ed. 2002) [hereinafter Tischler, 
Other Animals]. 
 11 Id. at 747 (emphasis added). 
 12 Joyce M. Tischler, The History of Animal Law, Part I (1972-1987), 1 STAN. J. ANIMAL 
L. & POL’Y 1, 2 (2008) [hereinafter Tischler, Part I] (first two sets of emphasis added). 
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tracking progress, examples of innovation, and trends. This second wave 
has been characterized not only by the lawsuits filed, but by the building 
of an infrastructure within the legal profession, so one can say with some 
certainty that animal law will be around long after its founders have been 
laid to rest. No one person can build a social movement. Animal law is the 
product of the unique and varied talents of many committed individuals 
and this article is dedicated to each of them.13 
Speaking interchangeably of “animal law,” “the animal law movement,” and 
animal law as a “social movement” is an expression of the view that by its nature 
animal law is a cooperative endeavor of like-minded attorneys. Defining animal law 
as a “movement” also reiterates the identification of animal law with animal rights 
law. As is noted below, proponents of animal rights view the struggle for such rights 
as a historical and logical development of preceding movements to gain legal rights 
for exploited groups, such as the civil rights and women’s rights movements.14 
Defining animal law as a “social movement” like these other movements also asserts 
that animal law aims at significant social change and seeks to accomplish this change 
by marshaling the support of society in general.  
Innumerable statements by proponents of advocacy-oriented definition place at 
the core of animal law itself the advocacy of animal rights—and indeed advocacy of 
some of the same legal rights for animals that are accorded to humans. For example, 
in an article describing the early history of animal law at Lewis & Clark Law School, 
Nancy Perry writes as follows: 
In 1993, three hundred and ten years after Thomas Tryon published what 
is believed to be the first English language work employing the term 
“rights” in a discussion of the “violence and oppression” of society’s 
treatment of animals, the students at Lewis & Clark Law School founded 
the first student chapter of the Animal Legal Defense Fund, and hosted 
the first Animal Law Conference. In the decade that followed, the 
fundamental ethical principle underlying Tryon’s condemnation of his 
seventeenth century contemporaries—that animals have the same 
fundamental right to legal protection from “violence and oppression” as 
everyone else—has enjoyed an unprecedented renaissance in the United 
States, and has spawned a compelling and propitious new field of law 
virtually unheard of in the preceding decade. . . . 
 
It requires no rhetorical license to say that Lewis & Clark Law School is 
the very epicenter of the movement to explore and develop the legal 
means to answer the solitary thesis that Tryon nailed to the door of our 
society more than three-hundred years ago.15 
Perry’s statement reflects the view of proponents of rights-centered advocacy 
definition that animal law, by its nature, seeks to remedy allegedly outrageously 
                                                            
 13 Joyce M. Tischler, A Brief History of Animal Law, Part II (1985-2011), 5 STAN. J. 
ANIMAL L. & POL’Y 27, 28 (2008) [hereinafter Tischler, Part II] (emphasis added).  
 14 See infra Part IV.E. 
 15 Nancy V. Perry, Ten Years of Animal Law at Lewis & Clark Law School, 9 ANIMAL L. 
ix, ix (2003).  
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unethical and oppressive behavior by seeking fundamental rights for animals. She 
also believes that law school courses in animal law have this goal.16 This is not 
surprising. If animal law is, as Tischler states, animal rights law—meaning advocacy 
of legal rights for animals—then law school courses in animal law will be courses in 
advocacy for animal rights. As Richard Katz observes,  
[d]ecades ago, when animal lawyers across the country first came 
together, they realized that the fight for recognition of the rights and 
protection of animals by the law had to be staged on two fronts. First, they 
committed to use what resources the law provided to protect the 
population of animals then existing. Additionally, they recognized that the 
only thing that would protect the populations of animals in the future 
would be to make animal law education available to those who would 
practice law in the coming generations.17 
Also not surprising is the fact that lawyers who speak interchangeably of animal 
law, animal rights law, and the animal law movement, regard law school courses in 
animal law as an important component of this movement. For example, law 
professor Peter Sankoff begins his discussion of the growth in the number of animal 
law courses as follows: 
Although the extent to which the animal law movement has succeeded in 
generating meaningful change for animals remains a subject of debate, 
one thing about the movement cannot be disputed: it is growing at a 
remarkable pace, both in the United States and abroad. For one thing, 
there are more people working as animal lawyers and studying to earn this 
informal classification than ever before. Where twenty years ago 
individuals practicing or trying to acquire knowledge in this area operated 
in isolation, today’s enthusiast can attend animal law conferences, 
participate in moot court simulations and chat with like-minded 
individuals on animal law related websites. Most importantly, for the 
student undertaking the study of law in 2008, there now exists a very 
strong possibility that the institution they attend offers a course in animal 
law or will do so in the near future.18 
Another locution that many proponents of rights-centered advocacy definition of 
animal law have adopted is that animal law by its nature aims at a “paradigm shift” 
in how the law deals with animals. An especially significant usage of this term 
occurred in the mission statement of the American Bar Association (ABA) Tort Trial 
and Insurance Practice Section (TIPS) Animal Law Committee, which was formed 
in 2004.19 Chairperson Barbara Gislason declared on the Committee’s official 
website that  
                                                            
 16 Id.  
 17 Richard J. Katz, Origins of Animal Law: Three Perspectives, 10 ANIMAL L. 1, 1 (2004).  
 18 Peter Sankoff, Charting the Growth of Animal Law in Education, 4 J. ANIMAL L. 105, 
105 (2008) (references omitted). 
 19 Animal Law Committee, A.B.A. TORT & INS. PRAC. SECTION, http://www.abanet.org/
tips/animal (last visited Aug. 10, 2005) (emphasis added). 
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Animal law is broader than laws pertaining to animals. It is the body of 
law reflecting the efforts of people to create a just world through the rule 
of law. The status of animals in our legal system is in flux and attorneys 
are discovering creative and interesting ways to use legal arguments in the 
face of increasingly complex scenarios. Our clients are legally impacted 
by a vast array of human/animal interactions. They range from the legality 
of estate planning for companion animals, to changing liability standards 
and insurance coverage in dog bite cases, to compensation beyond fair 
market value when an animal is killed, to public and private conflicts 
about where an animal can be, and finally, to the competing interests of 
wild animals and urban, farming, and recreational land use. . . . 
 
The mission of the Animal Law Committee is to evolve our thinking on 
animal issues for both the United States and the world. By attracting the 
best and brightest lawyers in this country, with a wide variety of 
perspectives, we will look at animal-related problems and issues today, 
and think about new ways to define, manage, and solve them. Utilizing 
problem-solving strategies, we will also look at the law as it exists 
today—fragmented around the country—and envision what it could be. 
The TIPS ABA Animal Law Committee will be the instrument of a 
paradigm shift, and will bring to the table and address legitimate business 
and economic interests, and humane concerns.20 
The first two sentences of this statement unequivocally reject descriptive 
definition of animal law. The entire statement indicates that animal law seeks not 
minor improvements in the treatment of animals, but significant changes across a 
range of issues—a “paradigm shift” in how the law deals with animals. The 
Committee’s statement does not define this term, nor does it explicitly mention 
                                                            
 20 Id.; see also, Barbara J. Gislason, The Animal Law Committee: A New Commitment for 
TIPS and the ABA, 34 WTR BRIEF 6, 10 (2005) (repeating the second paragraph). An article 
published on behalf of the Committee in 2009 reiterated its commitment to a “paradigm shift,” 
but contains unclear statements that might include the inconsistent endorsement of a 
descriptive definition of animal law. The authors state that the Committee:  
embodies the qualities that make TIPS so special: diversity and balance. This young 
committee’s mission is to promote a paradigm shift in the field of animal law by 
attracting the best and brightest lawyers, with a wide variety of perspectives, in order 
to examine animal-related issues and develop novel ways to address them. 
Meena Alagappan & Joan Schaffner, Animal Law Committee: Leading the Pack in the 
Emerging Field of Animal Law, 38 WTR BRIEF 8, 8 (2009) (emphasis added). The authors 
also state: 
Whether you specialize in the area of animal law, have clients with animals who seek 
your advice, or are just interested in the legal issues surrounding animals, the ALC is 
for you, and we welcome your participation. We encourage you to join and become 
involved in an innovative and active committee on the cutting edge of the law. 
Id. at 9 (emphasis added). The italicized portions of these statements appear to disavow a 
rights-centered definition of animal law, but the talk of a “paradigm shift” and of an 
“innovative and active” committee “on the cutting edge of the law” seem to reiterate the 
Committee’s original rights-centered definition. 
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animal “rights.” However, those who speak of “paradigm” shifts or changes in laws 
that affect animals typically mean affording animals legal rights and, more 
specifically, effecting a change in their status from property owned by persons to 
persons in their own right who have standing to sue on their own behalf for alleged 
wrongdoing against them.21  
2. Definitional Elements and Compatible Claims 
As the foregoing examples illustrate, the rights-centered advocacy approach 
includes in the definition of animal law the following propositions: (1) Animal law 
seeks to protect and benefit animals; (2) Achieving this goal requires widespread and 
significant changes in how the law deals with animals; (3) More specifically, animal 
law’s central and ultimate aim is a paradigm shift in how the law deals with animals. 
This shift will involve according to animals legal rights they do not yet possess, 
including rights that involve and will follow from their change in status from 
property to persons; and (4) Animal law is practiced by attorneys who share common 
values and goals, who work to effect significant social change, and who seek to 
enlist the support of society in general. Animal law is thus itself a social movement, 
like the civil rights or women’s rights movements. 
Rights-centered advocacy definition is compatible with a range of different 
positions regarding how to advance fundamental legal rights for animals. For 
example, some lawyers who seek an ultimate paradigm change in the legal status of 
animals work to achieve, for the time being, more modest goals, some of which 
reflect the current legal status of animals as property.22 There is also disagreement 
among those who seek fundamental legal rights for animals (whether or not they 
define animal law to include promotion of such rights) about whether animal lawyers 
should in the short-term cooperate with those who do not support a paradigm 
change, in order eventually to achieve such change.23 
                                                            
 21 See, e.g., Lee Hall, Gary Francione’s Introduction to Animal Rights: Your Child or 
Your Dog?, 34 SUFFOLK U. L.REV. 83, 93 (2000) (book review) (“When our paradigm shifts, 
and we are ready to seriously undertake to end the commodification of nonhumans, the 
historically profound constitutional tools are in place, including the Thirteenth Amendment’s 
prohibition of slavery. . . . The use of nonhuman animals underlies an enormous proportion of 
our current economic and social interactions. The law will embrace the idea only after a 
paradigm shift, or a profound change in our world view.”); Paul Waldau, Will the Heavens 
Fall? De-Radicalizing the Precedent-Breaking Decision, 7 ANIMAL L. 75, 107 (2001) (“Once 
common law extends beyond its present speciesism, the ‘humans only’ paradigm that traps 
judges in a universe that no longer exists will no longer control. Being nonhuman will no 
longer, per se, disqualify one from legal personhood.”); Steven M. Wise, The Legal 
Thinghood of Nonhuman Animals, 23 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.REV. 471, 475 (1996) (“The 
paradigm of all nonhuman animals as legal things has presented formidable obstacles to the 
development of personhood for nonhuman animals under the common law, indeed throughout 
Western law.”). The term “paradigm shift” was popularized by Thomas Kuhn, who argued 
that science advances by adopting radically different (and, as Kuhn maintained, conceptually 
incompatible) ways of looking at the universe. Among Kuhn’s examples was the rejection by 
astronomy of the view that the sun and planets revolve around the Earth, in favor of the view 
that the planets revolve around the sun. THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC 
REVOLUTIONS (1962). 
 22 See infra Part III.B. 
 23 The most prominent opponent of such cooperation has been Gary Francione. He argues 
that by working with those who accept the use of animals in agriculture and research, for 
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B. Reformist Advocacy Definition 
There is a second variant of advocacy-oriented definition, which I shall call 
“reformist,” because it defines animal law as seeking changes in how the law deals 
with animals that are less fundamental than the changes demanded by rights-centered 
advocacy definition. In her history of animal law, Tischler describes what she calls a 
“split” in the “approach to the practice of animal law,” which she characterizes as 
“rights versus welfare reform.”24 In the animal ethics literature, the distinction 
between promotion of animal “rights” and animal “welfare” is commonplace. It is 
often said that advocates of animal rights seek to end all human use of animals for 
the benefit of humans or animals. In contrast, advocates of animal welfare are said 
not to oppose human use of animals in general, or most traditional uses in particular 
(such as raising animals for meat); rather, they attempt to improve the lives of 
animals used in these ways by preventing them from suffering unnecessary pain or 
distress or by promoting their health and well-being.25 Tischler states that  
[f]rom its outset, the animal law movement has struggled with the 
distinction between rights and welfare and the resulting choice of which 
concept to spend one’s time promoting. Proponents on each side argue 
their positions vehemently, each believing that the approach he supports 
will provide the most likely, if not the only, path to meaningful change in 
the status of and protections received by animals.26  
Tischler’s statement—that from the outset the animal law movement struggled 
with the distinction between rights and welfare—contradicts her other claims, quoted 
above, that animal law is animal rights law and that promotion of animal rights was 
the central aim of lawyers who first talked about and created the field.27 In any event, 
there are lawyers who believe that many animals are treated horribly and that ending 
this mistreatment requires vigorous and extensive legal action; who hold that animal 
law, by definition, seeks to advocate on behalf of animals; and who view animal law 
as a movement in the sense of a common effort by lawyers to use the law to benefit 
animals. However, they do not believe that animal law, by definition, must seek 
legal rights for animals that would mark a paradigm shift in how the law deals with 
them by, among other things, changing their status from property to persons.  
One supporter of reformist advocacy definition, and the only proponent of animal 
welfare, as distinguished from animal rights, identified by Tischler in her article, is 
                                                            
example, people who call themselves “animal rights” advocates in fact strengthen institutions 
and practices that violate animal rights, by helping to improve the lot of animals sufficiently to 
satisfy the public that these animals are being treated properly. See GARY L. FRANCIONE, RAIN 
WITHOUT THUNDER: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE ANIMAL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 78-109 (1996). 
 24 Tischler, Part II, supra note 13, at 48. 
 25 See, e.g., FRANCIONE, supra note 23, at 1-6 (maintaining that animal “rights” and 
“welfare” are incompatible concepts). But see JERROLD TANNENBAUM, VETERINARY ETHICS 
150-52 (2d. ed. 1995) (arguing that advocacy of animal welfare and rights are compatible 
under a commonly used concept of “rights” that allows for human use of animals). 
 26 Tischler, Part II, supra note 13, at 48. 
 27 See Tischler, Part I, supra note 12.  
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Jonathan Lovvorn.28 Lovvorn urges practitioners of animal law to work to improve 
the lot of animals—but not to try to obtain legal rights for animals, not to compare 
their efforts to the civil rights movement, and not to seek a paradigm shift in the 
legal status of animals.29 Lovvorn maintains that “this society’s support for granting 
nonhuman animals meaningful rights is exceedingly low. And it is likely to remain 
so for a good long time.”30 He argues that animal lawyers  
can make a good start by jettisoning our own revolutionary rhetoric—
such as granting animals “personhood” or otherwise eliminating the 
property status of animals. It is an intellectual indulgence and a vice for 
animal lawyers to concern ourselves with the advancement of such 
impractical theories while billions of animals languish in unimaginable 
suffering that we have the power to change.31  
Tischler, I would suggest, overestimates the degree of acceptance of Lovvorn’s 
views among early and current proponents of advocacy definitions of animal law. 
She says that  
Lovvorn’s plea has gained a good deal of traction with animal law 
practitioners who are either more attuned to welfare concepts or are 
pragmatically viewing incremental reform as the only truly viable option. 
. . . We cannot know at this early juncture which path will create greater 
gains for animals, whether one will dilute the other or support and 
enhance the speed of progress.32  
However, Tischler devotes relatively few sentences to Lovvorn’s approach, as 
compared with lengthy discussions of the views and activities of animal rights 
advocates.33 This discrepancy is not, I submit, intended to unfairly bolster her own 
choice of rights-centered definition of animal law; it reflects the fact (as is clear from 
her extensive historical account) that from its inception until the present, the great 
majority of lawyers who define animal law in terms of animal advocacy have 
believed that animals should be accorded fundamental legal rights that would mark a 
paradigm shift in how the law deals with them. 
Lovvorn appears to believe that in an ideal (though for the foreseeable time 
unattainable) world, animals would have fundamental legal rights that would render 
them persons and not property.34 However, there are doubtless some lawyers who do 
not believe that animals should even in an ideal world have legal rights or be 
regarded as persons, and who still want to define “animal law” in terms of animal 
                                                            
 28 Tischler, Part II, supra note 13, at 51. 
 29 Jonathan R. Lovvorn, Animal Law in Action: The Law, Public Perception, and the 
Limits of Animal Rights Theory as a Basis for Legal Reform, 12 ANIMAL L. 133, 136 (2006). 
 30 Id. at 136. 
 31 Id. at 139. 
 32 Tischler, Part II, supra note 13, at 52. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Lovvorn, supra note 29, at 142 (stating that it is a “hard truth” that “each and every one 
of us is most likely going to depart this Earth living in a country that does not recognize the 
legal personhood of animals”).  
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advocacy. Additionally, as I (and others) have argued, it is possible to ascribe legal 
rights to animals that do not imply that they are legal persons, that they should have 
standing to sue on their own behalf, or that they cannot be used in a myriad of ways 
for the benefit of humans or other animals. According to this view, cruelty-to-
animals statutes, for example, accord animals covered by these statutes the legal 
right not to be treated cruelly, although these animals do not have standing to sue, 
and remain property of their owners.35 A number of courts have endorsed this view.36 
Evidence that some lawyers favor advocacy-definition of animal law that includes 
promotion of animal rights, but not fundamental, paradigm-changing rights, may be 
provided by the following description of the Animal Law Section of the State Bar of 
Michigan. According to its Chairperson, the Section was established  
for the purpose of promoting the interests of attorneys concerned about 
the welfare of animals. The goals of the section are to educate members of 
the Bar and the public about legal issues concerning animals, promote 
legislation/regulations that advance animal protection and animal rights, 
facilitate communication between concerned attorneys, and encourage 
changes in the law. . . . 
 
In the last five years, there have been exciting developments in the area of 
animal law. Attorneys as well as the general public are becoming 
increasingly aware of and intolerant of unjust laws and behaviors that 
adversely affect animals.37  
Although this statement includes advocacy of animal “rights” in its conception of 
animal law, it also includes promotion of animal “welfare” and “protection.” It is 
therefore reasonable to interpret the statement as endorsing a wide range of changes 
in the treatment of animals, which would include promotion of rights in the sense in 
which animal rights is consistent with animal use, animal welfare, and the legal 
status of animals as property. 
By “reformist” advocacy-oriented or advocacy definitions of animal law, I mean 
definitions that include advocacy on behalf of animals, but do not include promotion 
                                                            
 35 See, e.g., Tom L. Beauchamp, Opposing Views on Animal Experimentation: Do 
Animals Have Rights?, 7 ETHICS & BEHAVIOR 113 (1997); JOEL FEINBERG, Human Duties and 
Animal Rights, in RIGHTS, JUSTICE, AND THE BOUNDS OF LIBERTY 185 (1980); Jerrold 
Tannenbaum, Animals and the Law: Property, Cruelty, Rights, 63 SOCIAL RESEARCH 538 
(1995). 
 36 See, e.g., Cetacean Community v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1175 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Animals 
have many legal rights, protected under both federal and state laws. In some instances, 
criminal statutes punish those who violate statutory duties that protect animals.”); State v. 
Karstendiek, 22 So. 845, 847 (La. 1897) (asserting that the state animal cruelty statute “is 
based on the theory, unknown to the common law, that animals have rights which, like those 
of human beings, are to be protected”). 
 37 Catherine L. Wolfe, The Annual Report of the Animal Law Section of the State Bar of 
Michigan, 79 MICH. B.J. 1340, 1340 (2000) (emphasis added). The Section filed an amicus 
brief supporting a plaintiff who sued a kennel for negligent infliction of mental distress 
allegedly caused to the owner by the death of the animal. The Section’s brief “argued that 
companion animals have social and psychological value for which their owners deserve 
compensation beyond the animals’ status as personal property. It offered scientific and other 
data to supplement the legal argument in the plaintiff’s own appeal brief.” Id.  
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of a paradigm shift in how the law deals with animals, or of legal rights that would 
reflect a change in the status of animals from property to persons. Reformist 
advocacy definition can be endorsed by lawyers who believe that animals should not 
be accorded legal rights; that animals should have minimal legal rights that would 
not reflect fundamental changes in their legal status as property; or that animals in an 
ideal world would have such fundamental rights, but that animal lawyers ought not, 
at least presently, work to establish these rights. Whatever their view of animal 
rights, proponents of reformist definition of animal law, like proponents of rights-
centered definition, assert that animal law by definition combats the widespread 
mistreatment of animals. Some proponents of reformist definition also explicitly 
characterize animal law as “the animal law movement.”38 
For a number of reasons, presenting a list of goals and tactics that are distinctive 
of reformist advocacy definition is not possible. First, there has been a wide range of 
aims and legal tactics that have been adopted by lawyers who view themselves as 
advocating benefits for animals that are more modest than those pursued by 
advocates of animal rights.39 Second, many proponents of rights-centered definition 
of animal law favor some of the same kinds of legal changes, and engage in the same 
kinds of litigation and lobbying, as lawyers who do not seek a fundamental legal 
paradigm shift. For some proponents of fundamental animal rights, these activities 
are viewed as stepping-stones to eventual paradigm change.40 Third, the concept of 
animal “advocacy” by itself is not useful in identifying examples of reformist 
conceptions of animal law. Legitimate questions can be raised about whether some 
of the goals and strategies of proponents of reformist definition will in fact benefit 
animals, and are therefore appropriately characterized as animal advocacy.41 In 
                                                            
 38 One such attorney is Pamela Frasch, who writes: “the term ‘animal law movement’ 
encompasses the efforts by legal professionals to ‘protect the lives and advance the interests of 
animals through the legal system’ (as defined by Animal Legal Defense Fund’s Mission 
Statement).” Pamela D. Frasch, Finding Our Voice: Challenges and Opportunities for the 
Animal Law Community, 14 ANIMAL L. 1, 1 n.4 (2007); see also Kathy Hessler, The Role of 
the Animal Law Clinic, 60 J. LEGAL EDUC. 263, 282 (2010) (“Animal law, like the law relating 
to civil and other human rights, is a part of a larger social justice movement. Though there 
may be disagreement about the importance of, or need for, this type of social justice work, the 
evidence is clear that the subjugation of animals in our society is substantial and results in 
significantly negative consequences for animals, and to some extent for people as well.”). 
Hessler defines animal law “to include legal efforts to determine, consider, and protect the 
interests of animals rather than any law that just happens to involve animals.” Id. at 264 n.5. 
Although Hessler does not include advocacy of animal rights in her definition of animal law, 
she appears to support some rights for animals, and speaks of animal law as “the movement 
for animal protection or rights.” Id. at 283. She also states that “[i]t is important for any 
advocate wishing to facilitate great change to consider how to create paradigm shifts. This is 
no less true in the field of animal law.” Id. at 277. 
 39 See infra note 41 and accompanying text. 
 40 See Francione, supra note 23; Richard Marosi, Every Dog Has His Day in Court, L.A. 
TIMES, May 24, 2000, at 1; infra text accompanying notes 40 and 41. 
 41 For example, one common position of reformist advocates (as well as of some 
advocates of eventual personhood for animals) is that animal owners ought to be allowed to 
sue veterinarians who negligently kill their animals for negligent infliction of emotional 
distress because: (1) many animals are treated as members of their owners’ families, and if 
someone can sue a physician who negligently kills a family member for emotional distress, so 
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characterizing reformist definition of animal law, it is therefore necessary to 
understand what aims and strategies proponents of such definition tend to think will 
benefit animals. 
The following are among the typical aims and strategies of proponents of 
reformist definition of animal law: urging courts or legislatures to reject the currently 
prevailing rule that restricts animal owners to recovery for economic damages from a 
veterinarian or other person who negligently kills their animal, and also to allow 
recovery for their emotional distress caused by such negligence; urging courts or 
legislatures to create a new cause of action for loss of animal companionship that 
would allow an animal owner to recover damages for emotional distress from 
someone who negligently or intentionally kills the animal; campaigning for statutes 
or regulations that would prohibit certain common practices used in raising animals 
for meat and other food products (such as confinement of multiple egg-laying hens 
in small cages and raising large numbers of pigs, chickens, turkeys, and other 
animals indoors in relatively small enclosures); urging legislatures to increase 
potential penalties for violation of cruelty-to-animals statutes; urging legislatures to 
prohibit large commercial dog breeding operations (so-called “puppy mills”); 
seeking restrictions on the breeding of dogs and cats to prevent unwanted animals 
from becoming strays or being killed in pounds and shelters; and suing federal 
agencies for alleged failure to promulgate or enforce effective regulations to protect 
animals used for research, marine mammals, and endangered species.42 
IV. EMERGENCE AND EARLY DOMINANCE OF RIGHTS-CENTERED DEFINITION  
For reasons explained below, advocacy-oriented definitions of animal law are 
fundamentally and, I shall argue, clearly flawed. To understand why such definitions 
have nevertheless gained significant acceptance, one must understand how talk of a 
field of “animal law” began and why most lawyers who began speaking about and 
promoting the field adopted rights-centered advocacy definitions. 
A. Necessary Conditions of an Area of Animal Law: Content, Connections, and 
Interest 
There are, I would suggest, three necessary conditions for a subject to be 
considered a distinct area or field of a body of knowledge, or of law. First, there 
must be a sufficient number of elements that constitute the subject matter of the 
purported field. We would not say, for example, that quantum physics is an area or 
                                                            
should an animal owner be able to sue a veterinarian; and (2) allowing such lawsuits will 
benefit animals and animal owners by motivating veterinarians to practice more competently. 
For defenses of these claims, see, for example, Christopher Green, The Future of Veterinary 
Malpractice Liability in the Care of Companion Animals, 10 ANIMAL L. 163, 189-204; (2004); 
Susan J. Hankin, Not a Living Room Sofa: Changing the Legal Status of Companion Animals, 
4 RUTGERS J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 314, 326-27, 399-404 (2007). However, it has been argued that 
allowing such suits would harm many animals and animal owners by making veterinary 
malpractice insurance premiums so expensive that veterinary fees would need to be raised 
beyond the ability of many veterinary clients to pay. See, e.g., Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Barking 
Up the Wrong Tree, L.A. TIMES, June 22, 1998, at B5; Victor E. Schwartz & Emily J. Laird, 
Non-Economic Damages in Pet Litigation: The Serious Need To Preserve a Rational Rule, 33 
PEPP. L. REV. 227, 261-67 (2006).  
 42 For discussions of these and other common aims of reformist animal advocates, see, for 
example, Hessler, supra note 38; Lovvorn, supra note 29. 
16https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol61/iss4/4
2013] WHAT IS ANIMAL LAW? 907 
 
field of physics (or that animal law could be an area or field of law) if there were no 
more than a handful of experiments or discoveries in quantum physics (or if there 
were just a few court decisions or statutes relating to animals). Second, there must be 
connections or relationships among these elements that reasonably lead people to 
classify the elements as belonging to the same field. Otherwise, there would be a 
random collection of constituents of physics or law, for example, and not what we 
could call a field or area such as quantum physics or animal law. Moreover, we do 
not in ordinary discourse apply the terms “area” or “field” unless the connected or 
related elements that make up the area or field have a distinctive identity that 
distinguishes the area from other areas in a general subject or discipline. If there 
were nothing distinctive about quantum physics that makes it significantly different 
from the general subject of physics or from other areas of physics there would be no 
need to speak of it as a field of physics. Likewise, if there is nothing distinctive 
about the connected or related constituents of animal law that would distinguish it 
from other areas of law, we would not speak of it as an area or field of animal law.43 
Finally, for reasons I shall explain shortly specifically with regard to animal law, the 
existence of a distinct area or field presupposes an interest on the part of a sufficient 
number of people in viewing the area or field as constituting a coherent and distinct 
area or field. 
B. The Long History of Law Relating to Animals 
There has long been enough material from which the legal profession could have 
attempted to construct a distinct area of animal law had the profession been inclined 
to do so. The early forms of action at common law that related to the possession and 
ownership of personal property were developed largely in response to situations in 
which cattle and other farm animals were killed or taken from their owners or 
bailees. Such was the case because these animals (cattle, oxen, sheep, chickens, and 
horses) were the major form of moveable property that people possessed at that 
time.44 Legislatures and courts have since dealt with an enormously broad range of 
animal-related issues, including determination of rights and obligations relating to 
the breeding and ownership of domestic animals; grazing rights and responsibilities; 
ownership and government authority regarding stray and wild animals; protection of 
persons and property from trespass or physical harm caused by animals; commercial 
contracts relating to the purchase and sale of animals and of food and fiber produced 
from animals; liability for sale of defective animal products; and nuisance and public 
health problems caused by diseased or dangerous animals. Beginning in the mid-
1800s, and increasingly thereafter, numerous statutes and regulatory schemes (such 
as state cruelty-to-animals statutes) have sought to protect animals from 
experiencing unnecessary and unjustifiable kinds of pain or distress when used for a 
variety of human purposes.45 Virtually every area of law has dealt at least to some 
                                                            
 43 See infra Part X.B.2.  
 44 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, 2 THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 
150-54 (2d ed. 1968). 
 45 A comprehensive summary of the law relating to animals from the early common law to 
the early twentieth century is contained in 2 AM. JUR Animals (1936). Excellent surveys of 
contemporary animal-related legal issues can be found in PAMELA D. FRASCH ET AL., ANIMAL 
LAW IN A NUTSHELL (2011) [hereinafter FRASCH ET AL., NUTSHELL] and LITIGATING ANIMAL 
LAW DISPUTES (Joan Schaffner & Julie Fershtman eds., 2009). I suggest in Part X.B.2 below 
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extent with animals—understandably, because of the many and important roles 
animals play in the economy, the environment, and the personal lives of the 
populace. 
C. Connections among Legal Principles Relating to Animals 
Moreover, there have long been significant connections among legal principles 
relating to animals. One important fact that underlies many of these principles is the 
legal status of many animals as private property. This status is fundamental, for 
example, to the ability of owners of animals to sue in tort for compensation if their 
animals are destroyed or stolen or their economic value is wrongfully diminished by 
others. That animals are property also explains why, pursuant to principles of 
criminal law, there can be criminal prosecution of those who steal or destroy others’ 
animals, and why in contract law, there can be enforceable agreements to buy and 
sell animals and products produced from animals. The property status of animals 
protects animal owners, in a variety of circumstances, from government taking of or 
restrictions upon the use and enjoyment of their animals without due process of law. 
D. Interest of Animal Advocates in Recognizing “Animal Law” 
A few commentators have used the term “animal law,” or have spoken of a 
“field” of law relating to animals, to refer to principles regarding animals that were 
part of the law well before the 1980s.46 However, before then the term “animal law” 
simply was not in general use among lawyers.47 Before the late twentieth century, it 
was not a lack of legal material, or connections among this material, that prevented 
lawyers from wanting to speak of and recognize an area of animal law. Missing was 
sufficient interest in classifying this material as a separate area of law.48 Without 
such interest, lawyers dealing with animal issues viewed themselves as working in 
other legal fields. For example, a prosecutor and defense attorney involved in an 
animal cruelty trial would have considered themselves to be practicing criminal law. 
A city attorney and a lawyer representing a home owner doing battle over the 
enforceability of an ordinance restricting the number of dogs permitted in homes in 
the city would have considered themselves to be practicing municipal, property, and 
perhaps constitutional law. The attorneys representing a landlord and a tenant in a 
dispute about whether the tenant should be allowed to keep a pet in her apartment 
                                                            
that some of the topics discussed in these books (e.g., sales of certain kinds of animals and 
veterinary malpractice law) might not appropriately be included in animal law. 
 46 See 2 AM. JUR Animals § 1 (1936) (“This article deals with the law relating to animals. 
It aims to cover the entire field of the law as it is affected by man’s relation to, use of, or 
exercise of ownership over, animals.”); MARGARET E. COOPER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ANIMAL 
LAW 1 (1987) (asserting that “animal law” is “the law relating to animals”); Richard A. 
Posner, Animal Rights, 110 YALE L.J. 527, 529 (2000) (reviewing STEVEN M. WISE, RATTLING 
THE CAGE: TOWARD LEGAL RIGHTS FOR ANIMALS (2000) [hereinafter WISE, RATTLING THE 
CAGE]) (commenting on Wise’s account of how animals were treated from the time of the Old 
Testament and into the eighteenth century and beyond, that his “treatment of the history of 
animal law is not entirely satisfactory. He fails to note the inconsistency between the law’s 
treating animals like slaves and what he takes to be the law’s ignorance of the commonality 
between people and animals.”).  
 47 See supra Part III.A.1; Tischler, Other Animals, supra note 10. 
 48 Id. 
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would have considered themselves to be practicing landlord-tenant and contract law. 
These attorneys would not have considered themselves all to be practicing the same 
type of law. None would have called what they were practicing “animal law.” 
There was not sufficient interest in viewing animal-related legal issues as 
constituting a single field, I would suggest, because relatively few lawyers spent a 
significant proportion of their time on animal-related matters. It would have been 
highly unusual for most attorneys of the kinds described in the previous paragraph—
indeed for the great majority of lawyers—to see many animal-related cases in the 
course of a year. If a lawyer had a case involving animals, she probably could learn 
enough about the law at that time to handle the matter. Because the next animal-
related issue could be years away, if it occurred at all, there was no need for most 
lawyers to gain general knowledge about how the law deals with animals even in 
their own areas of practice, much less in the law generally.  
Moreover, there certainly was usually no need for most lawyers handling an 
animal-related case to know about how attorneys in other legal fields handled 
animal-related cases. The lawyers involved in a cruelty prosecution, for example, 
likely would not have been interested in the ability of the city in which they 
practiced to seize or destroy stray dogs—unless that issue was directly relevant to the 
criminal case. It is therefore not surprising that most lawyers who handled animal 
cases did not consider themselves to be practicing “animal law,” but rather viewed 
themselves as practicing the types of law on which they spent a significant amount 
of their time and about which they required general knowledge.  
The key development that nurtured interest in finding similarities and 
connections in the vast body of law relating to animals, and viewing it as a distinct 
area of law, was the emergence (beginning around the 1980s) of a significant 
number of attorneys with similar views about what they regarded as the mistreatment 
of animals.49 Joyce Tischler describes them in her historical accounts of animal 
law.50 As Tischler notes, these attorneys began to devote a substantial portion of their 
legal practice to what they regarded as the protection of animals.51 They were the 
first to say that there is, and should be, a field called “animal law.” They were not 
hindered in doing so by the fact that (as discussed below) it might be impossible to 
find in the ways in which the law has dealt with animal-related issues a coherent and 
distinctive set of principles.52 The very aim of these lawyers—to promote animal 
interests (as they conceived of these interests)—was itself a common principle on 
which a coherent and organized field of animal law could rest.  
Documenting in detail the activities of the lawyers who began speaking of a field 
of “animal law” is beyond the scope of this Article. Some who participated in these 
events have provided excellent accounts of their work in organizing attorneys, 
bringing litigation, founding legal publications, and teaching early law school 
                                                            
 49 See supra Part III.A.1. 
 50 See Tischler, Part I, supra note 12; Tischler, Part II, supra note 13; see also Taimie L. 
Bryant, The Bob Barker Gifts to Support Animal Rights Law, 60 J. LEGAL EDUC. 237, 246-47 
(2010); Clayton Gillette & Joyce Tischler, Symposium, Confronting Barriers to the 
Courtroom for Animal Advocates: Introduction, 13 ANIMAL L. 13, 15-19 (2006).  
 51 Tischler, Part I, supra note 11. 
 52 Id. 
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courses in animal law or animal rights law.53 The publication of the first legal journal 
in 199454 and the first commercially available casebook in 200055 with the words 
“animal law” in their titles, as well as the formation of “animal law” bar association 
committees or sections,56 all indicated that talk of a new legal field was growing. 
Perhaps the best and most dramatic evidence of the recent vintage of acceptance of a 
field of “animal law” was the rapid increase in the number of law school courses on 
the subject. According to a 2008 survey, between 1986 and 1988 there was one law 
school course in animal law in the United States. Three courses were taught in 
United States law schools in 1995, with the number increasing to eleven in 1999, 
twenty-seven in 2002, fifty-five in 2005, and seventy-five in 2007.57 
E. Animal Rights Theory as a Motivating and Unifying Factor  
Another crucial development—the emergence of contemporary animal rights 
theory—motivated some attorneys to organize their practice of law around animal 
advocacy and helped them to find connections among diverse strands of law dealing 
with animals. In 1975, Australian philosopher Peter Singer published Animal 
Liberation. 58 Singer argued that standard practices of raising animals for meat and 
other food products, and using animals in research, are unethical because (in 
Singer’s view) they cause on balance more suffering to animals than benefits to 
humans.59 Singer is a utilitarian, and does not believe that animals have inherent 
moral rights that are violated by using them to benefit people or other animals.60 
Nevertheless, Singer is correctly credited with attracting to animal advocacy people 
                                                            
 53 The most comprehensive account is contained in Joyce Tischler’s two-part history. See 
Tischler, Part I, supra note 12; Tischler, Part II, supra note 13. For other descriptions of early 
talk of a field of “animal law,” see also Gillette & Tischler, supra note 50; Barbara J. 
Gislason, Animal Law: A Significant Journey, in LITIGATING ANIMAL LAW DISPUTES: A 
COMPLETE GUIDE FOR LAWYERS xxxi (Joan Schaffner & Julie Fershtman eds., 2009); Joyce 
Tischler, Building Our Future, 15 ANIMAL L. 7 (2008); Tischler, Other Animals, supra note 
10; Delcianna J. Winders, Confronting Barriers to the Courtroom for Animal Advocates, 13 
ANIMAL L. 1 (2006); Steven M. Wise, The Evolution of Animal Law Since 1950, in THE STATE 
OF THE ANIMALS II 99 (Deborah J. Salem & Andrew N. Rowan eds., 2003). 
 54 ANIMAL LAW, published beginning in 1994. Other law reviews have followed: THE 
JOURNAL OF ANIMAL LAW in 2005, THE JOURNAL OF ANIMAL LAW AND ETHICS in 2006, THE 
STANFORD JOURNAL OF ANIMAL LAW AND POLICY in 2008, and THE JOURNAL OF ANIMAL & 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW in 2009. 
 55 PAMELA FRASCH ET AL., ANIMAL LAW (1st ed. 2000) [hereinafter FRASCH ET AL., 
ANIMAL LAW]. 
 56 As of 2009, sixteen state Bars, and twelve regional bar associations had sections or 
committees devoted to animal law. Shaffner & Fershtman, supra note 44, at 2. 
 57 Sankoff, supra note 17, at 124. According to the ALDF, as of 2013 there were 146 law 
schools in the U.S. and Canada that “have offered a course in animal law.” Animal Legal 
Defense Fund, Animal Law Courses, http://aldf.org/resources/law-professional-law-student-
resources/law-students-saldf-chapters/animal-law-courses/ (last visited Jul. 29, 2013). 
 58 PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION (1975). 
 59 PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION 25-157 (rev. ed. 1990).  
 60 PETER SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS 14-71 (1979). 
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who became proponents of animal rights, by advancing the idea that animal causes 
could be supported by theories in philosophy and ethics.61  
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, there began to appear a number of 
philosophical defenses of what has come to be called animal rights theory, the most 
comprehensive (and still most influential) of which was Tom Regan’s The Case for 
Animal Rights.62 According to this theory, animals have certain interests of their 
own, irrespective of how humans view or use them.63 Animal rights theory further 
argues that animals have an inherent moral right to have these interests respected by 
humans, whether or not respecting these interests is on balance enjoyable or 
beneficial to us. Because these theorists call for ending the use of animals to benefit 
humans or animals, they are characterized (and characterize themselves) as animal 
use “abolitionists.” There is disagreement among abolitionist theorists regarding 
what qualifies animals for moral rights, and indeed about what kinds of animals have 
moral rights.64 However, all abolitionist theorists argue that animal rights implies, 
among other things, that people should not kill animals that have rights for meat, or 
use them in scientific or biomedical research, even if such research leads to great 
benefits for humans or animals.65  
Animal rights theorists, some of whom were lawyers, argued (and continue to 
argue) that fundamental moral rights possessed by animals—which people ought to 
recognize because it is ethically obligatory to do so—can be realized in fact only if 
these rights also become legal rights: rights that courts, legislatures, and regulatory 
bodies recognize and enforce. Animal rights theory identified a number of legal 
principles that it regarded as sources of the oppression of animals, including the 
categorization of animals as property and the absence of legal standing for animals.66 
Animal rights theory regarded legal rights for animals as a logically necessary and 
historically inevitable development of previous rights-movements, such as the civil 
and women’s rights movements, the aims of which were to extend legal rights to 
                                                            
 61 JAMES M. JASPER & DOROTHY NELKIN, THE ANIMAL RIGHTS CRUSADE: THE GROWTH OF 
A MORAL PROTEST 92-3 (1992) (observing that ANIMAL LIBERATION “gave the incipient 
[animal rights] movement an ideology and a vocabulary. Joyce Tischler, then a law student 
and later founder of the Animal Legal Defense Fund, says: ‘Singer’s book influenced us all. It 
gave us a philosophy on which to hang our emotions, feelings, sentimentality—all the things 
we had thought were bad; it gave us an intellectual hat to put on our heads.’ Activism for 
animals was no longer just compassion; it had recourse to systematic philosophical 
arguments.”).  
 62 TOM REGAN, THE CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS (1983). 
 63 Id. 
 64 See infra Part IX.C and notes 150-5.  
 65 See, e.g., Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, in IN DEFENSE OF ANIMALS 13, 13 
(Peter Singer ed., 1985) (“I regard myself as an advocate of animal rights—as a part of the 
animal rights movement. That movement, as I conceive it, is committed to a number of goals, 
including: the total abolition of the use of animals in science; the total dissolution of 
commercial animal agriculture; the total elimination of commercial and sport hunting and 
trapping.”).  
 66 See, e.g., GARY L. FRANCIONE, ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE LAW 33-49, 65 (1994); 
WISE, RATTLING THE CAGE, supra note 46, at 23-34, 49-61 (2000). 
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oppressed or rightless groups.67 This purported link to other rights movements 
further encouraged practitioners of the new field of animal law (as they defined it) to 
regard the goal of significant social change as another feature that gave coherence 
and distinctness to animal law. 
In a discussion of the origins of animal law, Barbara Gislason, the first chair of 
the ABA Animal Law Committee (whose rights-centered definition is quoted above) 
confirms the key role of animal rights theory in the creation of the new field of 
animal law. She identifies what she calls the two “waves” that gave birth to, and then 
established, the field. 
[T]he First Wave of what we now call Animal Law was influenced by 
philosopher Peter Singer, the author of Animal Liberation, first published 
in 1975, as well as Animal Rights lawyers who emerged in the 1980s. 
They were concerned about subjects like standing, anticruelty, and of 
course, personhood. 
 
The Second Wave came in the new millennium, where it was particularly 
influenced by law school courses, case books, and law reviews, and the 
formation and evolution of bar associations, including the momentous 
inclusion of Animal Law in the ABA in 2004, the largest professional 
organization in the world.68 
F. Adoption of Rights-Centered Definition by Observers and Opponents of the 
Animal Rights Movement 
The statements about the nature and purpose of animal law quoted above are 
representative of how most of the early proponents of animal law viewed and 
defined the area.69 It is thus not surprising that rights-centered definition 
predominated not only in legal periodicals, but also in reports in the general public 
media. For example, according to a 1999 New York Times article, 
[m]ore than a generation after civil rights and environmental lawyers took 
their battles to the courts, there are now lawyers who say they are 
                                                            
 67 For an extensive historical account of how the animal rights movement has viewed itself 
as a logically necessary and historically inevitable development of earlier rights movements, 
see HELENA SILVERSTEIN, UNLEASHING RIGHTS: LAW, MEANING, AND THE ANIMAL RIGHTS 
MOVEMENT 27-54 (1996). 
 68 Gislason, supra note 53. 
 69 A notable exception has been Steven Wise, an early proponent of legal rights and 
personhood for at least some kinds of animals. Wise maintains that the term “animal law” “is 
neutral. ‘Animal law’ can be wielded by those working either for or against the interests of 
nonhuman animals. In a lawsuit brought to stop an abuse of nonhuman animals, both sides are 
practicing animal law. . . . ‘Animal rights law’ . . . the object of which is to have judges 
recognize that at least some nonhuman animals possess at least some basic legal rights, does 
not yet exist. However, the groundwork for its emergence is rapidly being laid.” Steven M. 
Wise, Animal Law—The Casebook, 6 ANIMAL L. 251, 253 (2000) (book review) [hereinafter 
Wise, Casebook]. Wise does not indicate whether his reason for endorsing a descriptive 
definition of animal law is the fact that, as discussed infra in Part IX.A, one cannot define an 
area of law that does not exist.  
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following in those footsteps on behalf of clients with names like Freckles 
and Muffin and Rainbow. 
 
Fighting for creatures like performing orangutans and dogs used in 
experimentation, the lawyers are creating a new field of animal law with 
far more ambitious goals than traditionally weak anti-cruelty laws. They 
are filing novel lawsuits and producing new legal scholarship to try to 
chip away at a fundamental principle of American law that animals are 
property and have no rights.70 
The early predominance of rights-centered advocacy definition of animal law is 
demonstrated by the fact that even opponents of animal rights accepted rights-
centered advocacy definition of the area—and maintained that the entire area of 
animal law was therefore unacceptable. For example, critics were characterized in 
the article quoted above as rejecting “animal law as the latest example of absurdity 
in the legal system” as well as “an attack on the economic system’s reliance on 
animal products that could wreak havoc in the courts.”71 In 2001, law professor 
Richard Cupp was reported as viewing the  
emergence of “animal law” as much more than simply trying to 
dispassionately calculate the value of lost afternoons watching your cat 
nap in the sunshine. 
 
“The strongest proponents of this trend are in favor of blurring the 
distinction between humans and animals. They see this as one battle in 
that war,” he said. “I think it is harmful for society if the law encourages 
that attitude, to value a pet in the same way we value a human being.”72 
Likewise, some supporters of the use of animals in biomedical research 
condemned animal law itself on the grounds that the field, by definition, includes a 
commitment to animal rights, including the right of animals not to be used in 
research. For example, a 2000 editorial in Nature Neuroscience, which rejected 
demands by animal rights lawyers to curtail or prohibit animal experimentation, 
remarked that “animal rights advocates are working to build not only case law but 
also legal scholarship in their field: courses in animal law are now being offered at 
                                                            
 70 William Glaberson, Legal Pioneers Seek to Raise Lowly Status of Animals, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 18, 1999, at A1; see also, e.g., Marosi, supra note 40 (“For now, animal law attorneys are 
focusing primarily on broadening the rights of pet owners by recognizing the human suffering 
caused by the loss or injury of a pet. But eventually, some activists hope courts will extend 
certain rights to animals—changing their status from simple property to something more. Such 
a shift could have broad implications, giving new protections to lab animals and prompting 
tougher punishments against humans who abuse pets.”); Dru Sefton, Small but Growing 
Number of Attorneys Specialize in Animal Law, NEWHOUSE NEWS SERVICE (Washington, DC), 
Mar. 27, 2002, at 1 (describing “animal law attorneys” as “guardians of the interests of 
nonhumans, they work to protect and provide legal rights to companion pets, wildlife, farm 
livestock and research animals”). 
 71 Glaberson, supra note 70, at A1.  
 72 P. Kennedy Page, The Potential Cost of Losing Fido’s Company, THE NATIONAL LAW 
JOURNAL, Jan. 17, 2001, at A15. 
23Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2013
914 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:891 
 
several prominent law schools.”73 In 2004, attorney Steven Michael, writing in The 
Physiologist, an influential journal for biomedical scientists, described the “leaders 
in the new field of animal law,” as engaged in the “campaign to provide new legal 
rights for animals.”74 Among these, he observed, would be the right not to be used in 
research, a right that would follow from the goal of animal lawyers to change the 
legal status of animals from property to persons.75 Michael concluded that  
[t]his is an evolving field of law and in that sense, efforts to address new 
legal challenges is akin to shooting at a moving target. We do not know 
when or how these challenges will be presented, but we do know a large 
number of talented and committed animal law advocates are seeking to 
limit severely or prohibit any animal research. The research community 
can, and must, rise to this challenge.76 
V. EMERGENCE OF DESCRIPTIVE DEFINITIONS OF “ANIMAL LAW”  
Descriptive definitions of animal law do not include advocacy on behalf of 
animals, and merely define the area (roughly, for reasons discussed below) as the 
body of law that deals with animals. By the early 2000s, such definitions began to 
appear with increasing frequency. A growing number of lawyers who did not share 
the views of animal rights advocates nonetheless wanted to learn more about how the 
law deals with animals. Some of these lawyers already represented, or thought they 
might represent, clients who did not share the views of the animal rights movement. 
Some of these lawyers were interested in a field of animal law, but not a field that 
was (by definition) committed to advocacy, fundamental legal change, or animal 
rights. In short, these lawyers were interested in an area of “animal law” that would 
be defined neutrally and thus descriptively. 
Striking evidence of the growing interest in a descriptively-defined area of 
animal law is provided by statements by some of the newly-formed bar association 
animal law sections, which explicitly disavowed rights-centered advocacy definition. 
For example, in 2002, the Washington State Bar Association’s Board established its 
animal law section, refusing to endorse “the animal rights movement in accepting 
animal law as a new field” and approving the section only “after being assured it 
would cover a broad area, including the intersection of landlord-tenant, animal 
control, trust and estate, and other laws.”’77  
In 2004, the new animal law section of the Arizona Bar “had to assure the Board 
of Governors and fellow lawyers that the new group would not be an animal rights 
section. There would be no lobbying against cosmetics companies, no call for animal 
suffrage, no blood thrown on fur coats.”78 One of the founders of the section stated 
                                                            
 73 Editorial, Legal Challenges to Animal Experimentation, 3 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 523, 
523 (2000). 
 74 Steven Michael, Animal Personhood—A Threat to Research?, 47 THE PHYSIOLOGIST 
447, 447 (2004). 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. at 450. 
 77 Kathy George, Animal Laws Gaining Attention: Movement Seeks to Clarify What Rights 
Exist, SEATTLE POST INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 2, 2002, at B1. 
 78 Tim Eigo, Laws for Paws: A New Breed of Law Section, 42 ARIZ. ATT’Y 14, 16 (2005). 
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that “[w]e are a mandatory bar, and we can’t be an advocacy section; we have to be 
an academic section to consider the law.”79  
The Maryland State Bar Association, in 2005, established its animal law section 
and explicitly disavowed rights-centered definition.80 According to one report, 
although some of the section’s members considered themselves animal rights 
advocates, 
the recruiting advertisements the committee ran in various bar journals 
around the state specified that the group “is not an animal rights group or 
a political organization, but rather a forum for attorneys of all viewpoints 
whose practices may involve animal-related issues.” The ads listed some 
of the types of lawyers who had attended the first meeting in November: 
people interested in protecting farmers and researchers from “over-
reaching animal rights legislation,” strengthening animal cruelty laws, 
working with the horse racing industry, changing veterinary malpractice 
laws, protecting the sport of fox chasing.81  
The Animal Law Committee of the Florida Bar Association also met resistance 
from lawyers who assumed it would promote animal rights. The vice chair of the 
committee, an animal rights advocate, assured bar members that the  
purpose of the committee is to provide information on the development of 
animal law, not to be an advocacy group. . . . We understand that. So we 
have members who are on both sides of animal law-related issues. There 
is no animal rights law. There is animal law. Just like we have a family 
law section; it’s not an advocacy group.82  
In the early 2000s, some texts and discussions that were aimed at lawyers in 
general began to employ descriptive definitions of animal law. They did so, I would 
suggest, for the same reason some animal law sections adopted descriptive 
definitions: Lawyers who did not view themselves as animal advocates wanted a 
field of animal law that would facilitate their understanding and handling of animal-
related issues. The first commercially available casebook in animal law, which 
appeared in 2000, offered a descriptive definition of the area.83 Some lawyers 
                                                            
 79 Id.  
 80 See Caryn Tamber, All Creatures Great and Small, 5 DAILY RECORD (Baltimore), Mar. 
3, 2006. 
 81 Id. However, according to this report, some observers remained skeptical that the 
section would not become an advocate for animal rights: “‘Not everyone is thrilled when an 
animal law committee sets up shop, and there are people watching closely to see how the new 
group treads the line between animal law and animal activism. . . . We’ve seen in a lot of 
places the folks pushing the radical animal rights agenda tend to be sort of proselytizers,’ said 
Bill Horn, Washington counsel to the U.S. Sportsmen’s Alliance. ‘They’ve been behind a lot 
of these committees, and I think that’s why a lot of people look at them askance.’” Id.  
 82 Jan Pudlow, Bar’s Animal Law Committee Rounds Up Interested Lawyers, 32 FLA. BAR 
NEWS 26, 27 (Mar. 1, 2005). 
 83 FRASCH ET AL., ANIMAL LAW, supra note 55, at xvii ( “Animal law is, in its simplest 
(and broadest) sense, statutory and decisional law in which the nature—legal, social, or 
biological—of nonhuman animals is an important factor.”) For a critique of this and the 
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explaining the new field to colleagues also defined animal law descriptively.84 A 
2009 volume published by the ABA covers a wide range of issues relating to animals 
that lawyers are increasingly handling. This book defines animal law as follows: 
So, what exactly is “animal law”? All law is animal law. Animal law cuts 
across virtually every substantive area of the law, including tort, contract, 
property, family, taxation, trust and estates, insurance, criminal, 
administrative, international, and environmental. On the one hand, 
because companion animals are now so common in the United States and 
they are often considered family members, lawyers are now finding 
themselves confronted with “animal law” cases more frequently and 
require guidance. On the other hand, because of the continued growth in 
business industries involving animals, such as dog show and horse show 
industries, the demand is greater than ever for lawyers to serve these 
businesses on the many legal issues they confront. This book is designed 
to provide such guidance.85 
A 2011 publication of the ABA Law Practice Management Section, titled 
Careers in Animal Law, also offers a descriptive definition of the field. According to 
its author Yolanda Eisenstein, 
[a]lthough it started with the animal protection movement, animal law is a 
legal discipline. It is the law that affects, but not always protects, animals. 
While definitions vary somewhat, the first animal law casebook provides 
a good working definition: “statutory and decisional law in which the 
nature—legal, social, biological—of nonhuman animals is an important 
factor.” . . . Animal law is a city ordinance, a state or federal law, an 
international treaty, or a case whose provisions or result has an impact on 
an animal or animals. It is law, legal precedent, rules, and regulations that 
affect animals’ care and use, how they can and cannot be treated, and 
even whether or not they are considered animals.86 
Although Eisenstein defines animal law descriptively, the primary intended 
audience of her book is lawyers who want to advocate on behalf of animals.87 The 
book, she states,  
                                                            
descriptive definitions quoted infra in the text accompanying notes 84 and 85, see infra Part 
X.B.2.  
 84 See, e.g., Geordie L. Duckler & Dana M. Campbell, Nature of the Beast: Is Animal Law 
Nipping at Your Heels?, 61-Jun OR. ST. BULL. 15, 15 (2001) (endorsing the definition of in 
supra note 83 and also stating that “[i]nnumerable local, state and federal statutes and 
regulations that affect the welfare, use and abuse, sale and management, protection and killing 
of animals are all part of animal law”). 
 85 Joan E. Schaffner & Julie Fershtman, Introduction, in LITIGATING ANIMAL LAW 
DISPUTES: A COMPLETE GUIDE FOR LAWYERS xxxv (Joan E. Schaffner & Julie Fershtman, eds. 
2009).  
 86 YOLANDA EISENSTEIN, CAREERS IN ANIMAL LAW: WELFARE, PROTECTION, AND 
ADVOCACY 7-8 (2011). 
 87 Id. at xi-xii. 
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is for people who care about the welfare of animals. It is for lawyers and 
law students who are interested in careers where they can use the law to 
protect or improve the lives of animals. It is for lawyers who want to work 
for clients—whether corporations, governments, individuals, or 
nonprofits—whose work involves animals guided by a concern for their 
welfare. In my research and interviews, this reality quickly became clear, 
as the lawyers who called themselves animal lawyers were animal 
protection lawyers.88 
Eisenstein may be correct that, at least at present, attorneys who call themselves 
“animal lawyers” and who devote all or most of their legal practice to animal issues 
tend to be animal advocates in some sense, even though her definition of the field is 
descriptive and neutral. Herein lies a critical point that, as I discuss in detail below, 
strongly argues for descriptive rather than advocacy definition of animal law. If 
animal law is defined descriptively, lawyers who consider themselves animal 
advocates or proponents of views associated with the animal rights movement can 
practice animal law. But so can lawyers who do not consider themselves animal 
advocates, or who oppose (or represent clients who oppose) the views of animal 
advocates or of the animal rights movement. However, if animal law is defined in 
terms of animal rights advocacy, or advocacy of significant but less fundamental 
changes in how the law deals with animals, only lawyers who accept these views can 
practice “animal law.” 
Empirical studies have not been conducted to determine whether, at present, 
advocacy or descriptive definitions of animal law have greater popularity among 
lawyers. It is clearly the case that both approaches are well-represented. The choice 
of which approach the legal profession will make is therefore still an open one. 
There is still time to make the right, or the wrong, choice. 
VI. SOME GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF DEFINITION 
Proposing a general approach to defining areas of law is beyond the scope of this 
Article. However, some consideration of concepts and principles of definition 
generally accepted by scholars in the field of the philosophy of language is essential 
in formulating and evaluating definitions of animal law. Because there is 
disagreement about how to define the area, standards for evaluating definitions are 
needed for deciding which of the competing approaches to defining animal law is 
preferable. Significantly, none of the authors of proposed definitions of animal law 
that have been published to date explicitly defends, or even identifies, the standards 
these definitions are supposed to reflect.  
A. Components and Nature of Definitions 
All definitions consist of two components: (1) the word or term being defined 
and (2) the definition of the word.89 Philosophers of language employ the terms 
“definiendum” (Latin for “that which is defined”) to refer to the former and 
“definiens” (Latin for “that which defines”) to the latter.90 The definiendum is often 
placed in quotation marks (or can be italicized) to indicate that it is the word to be 
                                                            
 88 Id.  
 89 MAX BLACK, CRITICAL THINKING 188 (1946). 
 90 Id. 
27Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2013
918 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:891 
 
defined, and the definiens is set forth without quotation marks to indicate that the 
definiendum is not being defined simply in terms of other words, but in terms of 
what the definiens means.91 The following statement illustrates a typical formulation 
of a definition: “triangle” means a closed plane figure comprised of three connecting 
straight lines. Quite often, definitions omit quotation marks around the definiendum, 
or are responses to the question “What is an X?” or “What is X?” Thus, we can ask 
how “triangle” or the word “triangle” should be defined. We can also ask how a 
triangle should be defined, or what is a triangle? Likewise, we can ask how “animal 
law” or the term “animal law” is defined. We can also ask how animal law is 
defined, or as the title of this article inquires: What is animal law? These are all 
common and equivalent ways of asking how to define the words “triangle” or 
“animal law.” 
Formulations of definitions that do not indicate explicitly that a word is being 
defined need not be problematic as long as it is understood that a word is being 
defined. However, as philosophers of language observe,92 failure to understand that 
definitions are of words has led some authors of definitions to think that they are 
defining or analyzing a thing and not a word. This can be problematic because 
someone who thinks she is defining a thing may be drawn to questions that are not 
matters of definition, but issues of factual description or empirical investigation. The 
illustrious philosopher of language Max Black explains this point by considering the 
following statements:  
(A): A dictionary has the entry, “fox: Red-furred sharp-snouted bushy-
tailed quadruped.” 
(B): Foxes are swift runners.93 
As Black observes, these are fundamentally different assertions that require 
different kinds of investigation to determine their correctness.  
To establish the truth of B, we must observe foxes, or use the testimony of others 
who are in a position to do this: moreover, this is all we need do. One way of 
establishing the truth of A would be to wait for opportunities of hearing people say 
“That’s a fox!” checking in each such case whether the speaker did point to a 
quadruped that was bushy-tailed, and so on. If this procedure were followed, we 
should, as in the first case, observe foxes; but we should also observe people using 
the word “fox”; and A could not be tested without direct or indirect reference to such 
linguistic behavior. To look at foxes alone in order to test the definition would be as 
futile as looking at the planet Mars through a powerful telescope to see if the word 
“Mars” were inscribed upon it. The reason why we must pay attention to linguistic 
behavior in testing A is that the connection between being a fox and having red fur 
(or the other characteristics mentioned in the definition) is artificial or man-made. 
For this reason, also the definition, A, unlike the second statement, can also be 
established without attention to foxes at all—as by asking sufficiently competent 
speakers of English what they mean when using the word.94 
                                                            
 91 Id.  
 92 See, e.g., id. at 187-188; RICHARD ROBINSON, DEFINITION 12-34 (1950). 
 93 BLACK, supra note 89, at 187. 
 94 Id.  
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In sum, to determine whether the definition of a word like “fox” is correct, one 
asks whether the definition correctly reports how the word is used, that is, whether 
the definition accurately indicates the linguistic behavior of people who use the 
word. To determine whether certain factual claims about things to which these words 
refer are correct, one must examine the characteristics of the things themselves.95 
B. Definition versus Factual Descriptions or Ethical Conclusions 
That definitions are of words and not things has an important implication that 
some authors of definitions overlook: A typical definiens does not include, and 
indeed cannot include, the vast majority of things that are factually true of that to 
which the definiendum refers. Nor does a typical definiens include all value 
judgments regarding how people ought to think about, use, or in some other way 
interact with what the definition defines—even value judgments that almost 
everyone would regard as obviously correct.  
The term “astronomy,” for example, has been defined as “the science that treats 
of the celestial bodies, of their positions, magnitudes, motions, distances, 
constitution, physical condition, mutual relations, history, and destiny.”96 This 
definition does not include the many thousands of discoveries about celestial bodies 
made by astronomers. These are discoveries in the field of astronomy. Nor would the 
definition of astronomy include conclusions astronomers may reach regarding 
empirical controversies. Thus, if, as some astronomers now believe, Pluto is really 
not a planet of the Sun, the definition of “astronomy” would not be affected. Nor 
does the definition of “astronomy” include statements about which most people 
might agree regarding how astronomy should be viewed or used; for example, “The 
federal government should fund research in astronomy that can lead to important 
advances in knowledge about the universe.” This is a value judgment about 
astronomy. It does not affect the definition of astronomy, or what astronomy is. The 
definition of astronomy would not change if people changed their minds about 
whether the federal government should fund research in astronomy. 
C. Limited Role of Definitions 
Because definitions typically do not state factual truths about what is being 
defined, or how what is defined ought to be regarded or used, definitions tend to 
have a limited role. Factual discovery and ethical argument are discovery and 
argument about things, events, or practices that those who are doing the discovery or 
argument must already be able to recognize. Otherwise, they would not be making 
discoveries or arguing about the same things. If definitions of terms used in 
discovery or ethical debate had to contain everything (or even most or a significant 
proportion of things) true or ethically defensible about what is being defined, 
discovery and debate could not begin until people already knew a great deal about 
these things or agreed about how they ought to be regarded. 
Put another way, a shared definition of a word can make it possible for people to 
communicate about the thing, to learn about it, and to argue about what is or is not 
                                                            
 95 Some words do not refer to anything. For example, what philosophers call “emotive” or 
“expressive” terms, such as “ouch!,” “hurrah!,” or “stop!,” express an emotion or feeling (in 
the case of “ouch!”) or make a request or statement (in the case of “stop!” and “hurrah!”).  
 96 WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
UNABRIDGED 136 (1986 ed.). 
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factually true about it, or about what ought or ought not to be done with it. However, 
although a good definition can allow such inquiry and argument, it is almost always 
the inquiry and argument about which people are primarily interested. A student will 
not do well in an astronomy course if all he learns is the definition of the subject. 
Likewise, it is no accident that in a casebook, hornbook, or legal treatise in an area of 
law, discussion of the definition of the area typically constitutes a minuscule portion 
of the text. A student or lawyer who stops reading after the definition not only will 
fail as a student or lawyer, he will have misunderstood the primary purpose of the 
text: to help one understand the substance and rationale of the law. It does not 
diminish the importance of definitions to appreciate that they enable, but rarely guide 
or settle, discovery or argument. As I argue below, this limited role of definitions is 
an especially important virtue regarding definitions of areas of law. 
D. Purposes of Definitions 
1. Interrelation of Definitional Purpose and Content 
Philosophers of language emphasize two central features that one must consider 
in proposing or evaluating any definition: (1) the purpose or purposes of the 
definition—what the definition is intended to accomplish; and (2) the content of the 
definiens and the verbiage employed to convey this content. Definitional purpose 
and content are related. When a definition is constructed with careful attention to its 
purpose, the purpose can guide the content to some extent. To illustrate, Black cites a 
definition he attributes to Samuel Johnson’s famous Dictionary of the English 
Language: “Net: a reticulated texture with small interstices.”97 Black (who believes 
this definition was intended as a joke) observes that although it may accurately 
describe the kind of thing to which the word “net” refers, the definition is worthless 
in a dictionary intended for speakers of the English language because few speakers 
would understand it.98 Black states that the first rule of definition is that “[t]he 
definition should be adequate for the purpose for which it is intended.”99 
Accordingly, because the definition of animal law is in dispute, it is crucially 
important to consider carefully what purposes a definition of an area of law, and of 
animal law in particular, should have. 
2. Lexical and Stipulative Definitions 
Philosophers of language counsel authors of a definition to be clear about 
whether the fundamental purpose of the definition is to report on how certain 
speakers actually use a definiendum or to decide that the word shall be used in a 
certain way. Philosophers use the terms “lexical” or “reported” to refer to a 
definition intended to describe the actual use of a word100 and “stipulative” or 
                                                            
 97 BLACK, supra note 89, at 192. 
 98 Id. Although a towering figure in the history of the philosophy of language and 
lexicography, Black misquotes Johnson, who in fact defined “net” as “a texture woven with 
large interstices or meshes, used commonly as a snare for animals.” SAMUEL JOHNSON, 2 A 
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1357 (1755). Johnson’s actual definition was perhaps 
a bit better for its intended purpose. 
 99 BLACK, supra note 89, at 191. 
 100 Id. at 190-191; ROBINSON, supra note 92, at 59-62. 
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“stipulated”101 to refer to a definition that decides that the word shall be used as 
stated in the definiens. Stipulative definitions are commonly employed by scientists 
and members of the professions when an important term is used in more than one 
sense. As philosopher Richard Robinson observes in his classic study of definition, 
“[l]earned and professional societies make stipulative definitions in order that 
intercourse between their members may not be rendered futile by such 
ambiguities.”102  
For a number of reasons, it is important when assessing definitions of animal law 
to keep in mind the nature of stipulative definitions and standards that philosophers 
of language apply in evaluating them. First, at some time in the future a group of 
lawyers or legal academics (a committee of the American Law Institute, for 
example) might attempt to determine that the best way of resolving current 
disagreements about how to define animal law is for the legal profession to decide 
on a definition that lawyers shall henceforth employ. Second, even in the absence of 
a deliberate decision by a group of lawyers or some authoritative body about how to 
define animal law, eventually a definition that is generally accepted may emerge—as 
a result of individual decisions by lawyers that one of the two competing definitional 
approaches is preferable. Because stipulative definitions often reflect a choice among 
competing definitions of a given term, criteria for good stipulative definitions can be 
helpful in choosing between advocacy and descriptive definition of animal law. 
Robinson warns against “stipulating degenerate meanings for terms. A 
redefinition of a word degenerates if it leaves us bereft of any means of indicating an 
important distinction that could be indicated by the word in its previous sense.”103 
Thus, for example, if one stipulative or proposed definition of animal law prevents 
lawyers and courts from making distinctions that ought to be possible when thinking 
about how the law deals or should deal with animals and the other definition allows 
such distinctions, then the latter definition is preferable to the former. Robinson 
further states that “we may remind ourselves to be responsible in stipulation. We 
should consider what hangs on our stipulations in the way of good or bad 
consequences to human knowledge and communication and to our language as a tool 
of human communication and emotion and enjoyment.”104 In evaluating any 
stipulative or proposed definition of animal law, one must therefore ask whether this 
definition adds to or detracts from the ability of lawyers, the courts, and society to 
communicate and freely discuss all relevant viewpoints about how the law should 
deal with animals. 
E. Analytic Definition and its Limitations 
Since the time of Aristotle (384-322 B.C.), many scholars in scientific and 
academic fields have favored what is called “definition by analysis” or “analytic 
definition.”105 This method of definition seeks to characterize the meaning of a term 
that refers to a thing by analyzing the thing into its constituent parts. Aristotle 
                                                            
 101 BLACK, supra note 89, at 190; ROBINSON, supra note 92, at 59-62. 
 102 ROBINSON, supra note 92, at 66. 
 103 Id. at 82. 
 104 Id. at 91-92. 
 105 Id. at 153-54. 
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believed that each thing has a core essence that constitutes its fundamental nature 
and that the purpose of a definition is to state this essence.106 Accordingly, when 
applied to the definition of a term, analytic definition seeks to state what is 
“essential” to all uses of the term—understood as what is common to and distinctive 
of everything to which the term refers.  
One major form of analytic definition, associated with Aristotle himself, is 
known as “definition by genus and differentia” or “definition by division.”107 As 
described by Robinson, in defining a term that refers to a thing (an object, practice, 
or a field of inquiry, for example), this approach requires that we  
name a bigger class within which the object falls [its genus or general 
class] and then name something that distinguishes it from the rest of that 
class [its differentiating characteristic or characteristics]. If man falls 
within the bigger class of animal, and is distinguished from the rest of that 
class by rationality, we may define the word “man” as meaning the 
rational animal.108  
Definition by genus and differentia is often illustrated by reference to 
geometrical figures, such as the triangle.109 The term “triangle” can be defined as a 
closed plane figure (the genus or general class) comprised of three connecting 
straight lines (the differentiating characteristics). This definition captures the essence 
of the use of the term “triangle” by stating what is common to all things that are 
properly called “triangles” and by indicating what distinguishes triangles from all 
other plane figures, such as trapezoids and circles. 
Analytic definition has two important features. If one has defined a term (say, the 
term “A”) and there is something that people who use the term would apply to “A” 
but such usage is not encompassed within the definition, the definition is erroneous. 
The definition is also erroneous if it does not exclude from application of the term 
“A” something to which people who use the term “A” would not apply the term. For 
example, a definition of the term “human being” that does not include male members 
of the species Homo sapiens is erroneous because it does not include beings that 
speakers of English call “human beings.” A definition of “human being” that does 
not exclude members of the species Felis catus is erroneous because we do not call 
such beings “human beings;” we call them “cats.”  
As is discussed below, some legal scholars appear to think that only analytic 
definitions of areas of law are acceptable.110 Most philosophers of language now 
reject the view that all meaningful terms must be defined analytically, because of 
arguments advanced by the Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951). 
Wittgenstein demonstrated that many words used in ordinary discourse are not 
                                                            
 106 Id. As Robinson explains, Aristotle regarded definition as definition of things, and not, 
as is now accepted by philosophers, of words. Id. 
 107 BLACK, supra note 89, at 195-197. 
 108 ROBINSON, supra note 92, at 96. 
 109 See, e.g, id. at 96; Norman Swartz, Definitions, Dictionaries, and Meanings, http://
www.sfu.ca/~swartz/definitions.htm (last visited Dec. 29, 2013). 
 110 See infra Part VII.D. 
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capable of being defined analytically.111 In one of the most famous discussions in 
modern philosophy, he examined the word “game” (in the original German, 
“Spiel”).112 Although people know how to use this term and can identify games when 
they see them, it is impossible, Wittgenstein showed, to find anything common to all 
games, much less to find something that would distinguish games from all other 
practices or kinds of behavior.113 As Wittgenstein observed, there are board-games, 
card-games, and ball-games, which are quite different from one another. Many 
games involve winners and losers, but some do not. Many games involve more than 
one player, but some do not. Many games are amusing, but some are not. 
(Wittgenstein gives chess as an example of the latter).114 Wittgenstein compared 
many words in ordinary language to a rope: “What ties the ship to the wharf is a 
rope, and the rope consists of fibres, but it does not get its strength from any fibre 
which runs through it from one end to the other, but from the fact that there is a vast 
number of fibres overlapping.”115 In ordinary language, many terms are used and 
properly applied, even though there is nothing common to all uses of the term and 
nothing that excludes all uses of the term from uses of different terms. The search for 
a common thread or strand in the use of many terms is sometimes unsuccessful 
because such a thread sometimes does not exist.  
F. Impossibility of Defining Some Words 
Wittgenstein questioned not just the assumption that all words must be 
susceptible to definition by analysis. He also maintained that some words might not 
be capable of being defined at all, in the sense in which a definition is a precise and 
accurate statement about how the word is used.116 Some words, he argued, are used 
in so many different contexts, and in such complex ways, that such a statement is 
unachievable. He regarded the sciences, which often use key terms according to 
precise rules, as areas of endeavor in which defining terms, even analytically, is 
often possible. However, Wittgenstein argued that for many terms used in general 
discourse (such as the word “game”) it may simply be impossible to state clearly 
how these words are used. Wittgenstein criticized those who assume that all 
meaningful words must have a definition and then conclude that something must be 
wrong when one cannot be found.117 We just know what games are; we use the word 
“game” meaningfully, even if it is impossible to construct a precise definition that 
captures how the word is used in all possible contexts.  
                                                            
 111 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, 1 PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 66 (G.E.M. Anscombe, 
trans., 3rd ed. 2001). 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. 
 115 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, THE BLUE AND BROWN BOOKS 87 (1958) [hereinafter 
WITTGENSTEIN, BLUE & BROWN]. 
 116 Id. at 25-7. 
 117 Id. at 25.  
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VII. APPLICATION OF PRINCIPLES OF DEFINITION BY DEFINITIONS OF AREAS OF LAW 
For law students and attorneys, definitions of areas of law typically serve a 
limited, though useful, purpose. Whether in a law school course (in initial remarks 
by the instructor or in the opening pages of a case or hornbook) or at the beginning 
of a comprehensive legal treatise, the definition of an area of law usually functions 
as a welcoming introduction to someone who is not familiar with the area. The 
definition serves to quickly inform the learner about the area’s core features. Further 
explanation of these features follows, as the course or text considers the body of the 
area of the law itself.  
There are, however, other functions of definitions of areas of law that allow these 
areas to express and protect a number of fundamental aims and values of our legal 
system. What enables definitions of areas of law to do this is precisely that they are 
good definitions. It is beyond the scope of this Article to consider in detail a large 
number of definitions of areas of law to demonstrate how employment of standards 
of good definition advances these crucial aims and values of the law. Several 
representative examples will suffice.  
A. The Definitions of Most Areas of Law Include or Imply Very Little about These 
Areas’ Current Basic Concepts, Causes of Action, and Substantive Principles 
As discussed above, a central feature of good definitions is that they typically do 
not specify most facts that are true of what is defined or value judgments that are (or 
ought to be) made about what is defined. The fact that definitions of most areas of 
law specify or imply relatively little about the content of these areas is illustrated 
nicely by the standard definitions of criminal law and criminal procedure. LaFave 
defines criminal law (which he sometimes calls “substantive criminal law”) as 
follows: “The substantive criminal law is that law which, for the purpose of 
preventing harm to society, declares what conduct is criminal and prescribes the 
punishment to be imposed for such conduct. It includes the definition of specific 
offenses and general principles of liability.”118 He contrasts criminal law with 
criminal procedure, which he defines as being “concerned with the legal steps 
through which a criminal proceeding passes, from the initial investigation of a crime 
through the termination of punishment.”119  
These definitions of criminal law and criminal procedure include very little of 
substance regarding the subject matter of these areas. The definition of criminal law 
does not include, for example, the names of any crimes, specification of what acts or 
omissions constitute the elements of any crimes, or potential punishments that can be 
imposed for their commission. Likewise, LaFave’s definition does not mention, 
                                                            
 118 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 8 (5th ed. 2010) [hereinafter LAFAVE, CRIMINAL 
LAW] (emphasis added). LaFave provides the identical definition in his three-volume treatise 
on criminal law. Wayne R. LaFave, 1 SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 1.2 (2d ed.), available at 
Westlaw SUBCRL.  
 119 LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 118, at 3. In their text for law students on criminal 
procedure, LaFave and co-authors state that their “hornbook reviews and analyzes the law of 
criminal procedure—i.e., the law governing that series of procedures through which the 
substantive law is enforced.” WAYNE R. LAFAVE, ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 3 (5th ed. 
2009). The authors also begin their seven-volume treatise with the same definition. WAYNE R. 
LAFAVE ET AL., 1 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1.1(a) (3d ed.), available at Westlaw CRIMPROC 
[hereinafter LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE]. 
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much less define, a number of concepts fundamental to liability in criminal law, such 
as “act,” “omission,” “mens rea,” and “proximate cause.” The definition does not 
even contain further definition or characterization of the two fundamental concepts 
of criminal law: “crime” and “punishment.” The definition is consistent, for 
example, with the position of the Model Penal Code that an offense is a violation and 
not a crime “if no other sentence than a fine, or fine or forfeiture or other civil 
penalty is authorized upon conviction.” 120 LaFave’s definition of criminal law is also 
consistent with the classification of such offenses as crimes.  
The standard definition of criminal procedure quoted above is also largely 
content-nonspecific. There are a number of sources of rules of criminal procedure, 
including the Constitution of the United States and state constitutions; state and 
federal statutes dealing with criminal procedure; court rules; and decisional law 
interpreting constitutional, statutory, and common law principles.121 These sources of 
procedural rules and the rules themselves are not included explicitly or by 
implication in the definition of criminal procedure. 
Another area of law the definition of which states or implies little of the area’s 
content is contract law. Although minor variations in verbiage can be found in 
definitions of the term “contract,” the Second Restatement of Contracts states the 
substance of how the term is most often defined: “A contract is a promise or set of 
promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of 
which the law in some way recognizes as a duty.”122 This definition does not define 
the term “promise,” does not indicate what constitutes a breach of a promise, does 
not specify any ways that contract law recognizes the performance of a promise as a 
duty, and does not indicate what kinds of contracts the contract law of various 
jurisdictions deems enforceable or what kinds of remedies it makes available for 
breaches of contract. The definition also does not include, imply the existence of, or 
define central concepts of contract law that govern when promises are enforceable, 
such as “offer,” “acceptance,” “mutual assent,” and “consideration.”  
The common definition of tort law also states little regarding the area’s key 
concepts and substantive principles. Typically, a “tort” is defined as a “civil wrong, 
other than breach of contract, for which the court will provide a remedy in the form 
of an action for damages.”123 This definition does not include the names or elements 
of any torts, what kinds of acts or omissions can constitute their commission, what 
                                                            
 120 MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.04(5) (1962).  
 121 See LEFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 119, at § 1.7(a) (describing the 
various rule sources of criminal procedure); see also Criminal Procedure: An Overview, 
LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/criminal_procedure (last 
visited Jan. 29, 2013). 
 122 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1979); see also RICHARD A. LORD, 
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS 3 (4th ed. 2007) (quoting section 1 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND), 
supra as the “[t]raditional definition of the term ‘contract’”); SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW OF 
CONTRACTS 1 (1920) (“A contract is a promise, or set of promises, to which the law attaches 
legal obligation.”). 
 123 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 1-2 (5th ed. 
1984); see also VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ’S TORTS 1 (12th 
ed. 2011) (“A tort is a civil wrong, other than a breach of contract, for which the law provides 
a remedy. . . . A person who breaches a tort duty has committed a tort and may be liable to pay 
damages in a lawsuit brought by a person injured because of that tort.”). 
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kinds of injuries or damage they can compensate, remedies, or defenses to tort 
actions.  
Some generally accepted definitions of certain areas of law, however, are more 
specific regarding the content of these areas than are the definitions of criminal, 
contract, and tort law. The definitions of these areas of law include explicit or 
implied reference to documents, statutes, regulations, or decisional law that provide 
some specificity regarding the content of these areas. For example, federal 
constitutional law deals with the United States Constitution and judicial 
interpretation and application of its standards,124 and First Amendment law deals 
with the First Amendment of the Bill of Rights.125 Copyright law deals with the 
federal Copyright Act,126 and intellectual property law deals with copyrights, patents, 
and trademarks and their associated statutes.127 However, even when the definition of 
an area of law provides some specificity regarding its content or focus, the definition 
does not state or imply most of the details of the area’s content, which are subject to 
varied interpretations and to change. Standard definitions of federal constitutional 
law, for example, do not (with the possible exception of Marbury v. Madison, which 
is viewed as the decisional source of the area) contain or imply statements about 
precisely how the Supreme and other courts have interpreted the Constitution.128  
B. The Definitions of Areas of Law Typically Include or Imply Very Little about 
What Substantive Principles These Areas Ought to Endorse 
Like good definitions generally, definitions of legal areas typically do not include 
or imply propositions regarding how these areas ought to function. Accordingly, 
such definitions assert or imply very little about what basic concepts and substantive 
principles these areas of law ought to endorse. For example, the definition of 
contracts as agreements the law will enforce reflects the judgment of contract law, 
and of the law itself, that some promises ought to be enforced. The definition does 
                                                            
 124 See Constitutional Law: An Overview, LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/constitutional _law (last visited Jan. 29, 2013); Constitutional 
Law: Law and Legal Definition, USLEGAL.COM, http://definitions.uslegal.com/c/
constitutional-law/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2013) (stating that the “broad topic of constitutional 
law deals with the interpretation and implementation of the United States Constitution”). 
 125 See Constitutional Law: An Overview, LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/constitutional_law (last visited Jan. 29, 2013); First 
Amendment: An Overview, LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/
first_amendment (last visited Jan. 29, 2013). 
 126 See Copyright: An Overview, LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, http://www.law.cornell.
edu/wex/copyright (last visited Jan. 29, 2013). 
 127 See Intellectual Property: An Overview, LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/intellectual_property (last visited Jan. 29, 2013); Intellectual 
Property: Law and Legal Definition, USLEGAL.COM, http://definitions.uslegal.com/i/
intellectual-property/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2013) (“Intellectual property law covers the 
protection of copyrights, patents, trademarks, and trade secrets, as well as other legal areas, 
such as unfair competition.”). 
 128 See, e.g., Constitutional Law: An Overview, LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/constitutional _law (last visited Jan. 29, 2013); Constitutional 
Law: Law and Legal Definition, USLEGAL.COM, http://definitions.uslegal.com/c/
constitutional-law/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2013). 
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not, however, state or imply anything about what kinds of promises ought to be 
enforced. Likewise, the standard definition of criminal law reflects the judgment that 
some kinds of behavior ought to be punished by government. But the definition does 
not state or imply what kinds of behavior the criminal law ought to punish or what 
principles it ought to include regarding such matters as requisite mental states for the 
commission of crimes, defenses, and kinds and degrees of punishment for various 
types of behavior. 
C. The Definitions of Areas of Law Typically Include or Imply Very Little About the 
Underlying Fundamental Goals and Structure of These Areas 
There has been a great deal of sophisticated and important scholarship that 
attempts to elucidate the fundamental nature of various areas of the law by 
identifying and analyzing their key concepts and substantive principles and by 
examining whether there are underlying doctrines that explain and unify these 
concepts, principles, and structure. These so-called “theories of law” are typically 
classified as either “analytical” or “normative.” Analytical theories attempt to 
identify existing key concepts and substantive principles of an area of law, or of the 
law generally, and to explain why these concepts and principles have been adopted 
and how they are related. Normative theories argue that certain concepts and 
principles ought to be adopted by a given area of law or by the law generally.  
Both analytical and normative theories of law can be classified as either 
“instrumental” or “non-instrumental.” Instrumental theories characterize the 
fundamental purpose or purposes of an area of law in terms of some further purpose 
or a response to some kind of social problem.129 Perhaps the best known kind of 
instrumental theory is the “law and economics” approach, variants of which invoke 
(roughly) the promotion of general economic efficiency in the allocation of costs and 
resources.130 Non-instrumental theories, typically called “moralistic,” view areas of 
law or the law itself not as aimed at accomplishing some social aim, but as 
expressing certain moral principles that are entitled to adherence in their own 
right.131 For example, a proponent of law and economics jurisprudence might 
maintain that the purpose of tort law in general, and of the general rule that liability 
is imposed upon people who are negligent or at fault for certain actions in particular, 
is (or should be) to motivate members of society, most of whom are rational actors, 
to take cost-justified precautions in preventing or avoiding accidents. This, one 
might claim, is economically efficient because it results in optimal risk-taking. In 
contrast, a proponent of a moralistic approach might argue that tort law principles in 
general, and those regarding liability for negligence in particular, function (or should 
function) to reflect society’s judgment that people have a fundamental moral duty 
not to injure others in certain ways and that when they do so, they have a 
                                                            
 129 See, e.g., Jules Coleman & Gabriel Mendlow, Theories of Tort Law, in THE STANFORD 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., Fall 2010), http://plato.stanford.edu/
entries/tort-theories/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2013). 
 130 For a useful overview of the variety and complexity of “law and economics” theories, 
see Lewis Kornhauser, The Economic Analysis of Law, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY, supra note 129, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-econanalysis/ (last visited 
Dec. 26, 2012). 
 131 Coleman & Mendlow, supra note 129. 
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fundamental moral duty to make up for such injuries by compensating their 
victims.132 
Definitions of areas of law typically do not endorse or reject, explicitly or by 
implication, analytical or normative theories of these areas. That this is so is evident 
from the fact that there are disagreements about whether instrumental or non-
instrumental analytical or normative accounts of various areas of law are correct—
and whether, assuming an instrumental or non-instrumental approach is preferable, 
which such approach is preferable. Commentators could not argue about whether, for 
example, contract and tort law function, or should function, to maximize economic 
efficiency or to endorse certain moral principles unless the definitions of these areas 
allowed for such disagreement.133  
D. Some Areas of Law Are Not Susceptible to Analytic Definition 
Just as it is sometimes impossible to provide analytic definitions of terms used in 
ordinary discourse,134 there are standard definitions of legal areas that do not specify 
concepts or principles common to these areas and do not exclude all legal concepts 
or principles that are regarded as belonging to a different area of law. Although some 
of these definitions have been widely and successfully used by generations of law 
students and lawyers, even their authors sometimes reject them as unsatisfactory 
because they do not meet the—sometimes unachievable—requirements of analytic 
definition. For example, there is a long history of skepticism about the possibility of 
defining “tort law,” because there is no one element common to all torts and nothing 
that distinguishes all torts from other kinds of causes of action.135 Thus, according to 
the final edition of the Prosser and Keeton hornbook,  
[e]ven though tort law is now recognized as a proper subject, a really 
satisfactory definition of a tort is yet to be found. The numerous attempts 
which have been made to define the term have succeeded only in 
achieving language so broad that it includes other matters than torts, or 
else so narrow that it leaves out some torts themselves.136  
The authors discuss typically cited examples to demonstrate that analytic 
definition of tort law is impossible. Such examples include identical behavior that 
can qualify as the tort of conversion or the crime of theft, and voluntary assumption 
of duties that can qualify as contractual in nature but can also result in tort liability 
(for example, when a common carrier agrees to transport passengers, but is then 
                                                            
 132 For an excellent general survey of competing instrumental and moralistic accounts of 
tort law, see id.  
 133 See, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract 
Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 543 (2003) (“Contract law has neither a complete descriptive theory, 
explaining what the law is, nor a complete normative theory, explaining what the law should 
be. These gaps are unsurprising given the traditional definition of contract as embracing all 
promises that the law will enforce.”). 
 134 See supra Part VI.F. 
 135 KEETON ET AL., supra note 123, at 1-2 (emphasis added). This discussion includes a 
number of references to other authors who have contended that it is impossible to define “tort” 
or “tort law” for these same reasons. 
 136 Id. 
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liable for negligently injuring them).137 The authors state that for the general purpose 
of defining tort law, “[b]roadly speaking, a tort is a civil wrong, other than a breach 
of contract, for which the court will provide a remedy in the form of an action for 
damages.”138 However, they simply assume, without supporting argument, that only 
an analytic definition of tort law would be satisfactory—even while conceding that 
their definition is “sufficiently accurate to serve the purpose.”139  
One area of law that clearly intersects other areas is the law of property. As one 
leading discussion defines it, “private property” is “the right of a person or a defined 
group of persons to use a thing and to exclude others from interfering for a time long 
enough to extract from the thing the benefits it is capable of affording.”140 Because 
there are so many different kinds of contexts in which claims of property rights can 
arise, and different kinds of uses of property, property law overlaps areas of law that 
regularly deal with issues relating to persons’ ability to use things and exclude others 
from using or affecting them (such as real estate, commercial transactions, 
constitutional, contract, criminal, environmental, land use, and tort law), as well as 
areas of law that focus on particular kinds of property (such as intellectual property 
and marital property law). Animal law, one of the central concerns of which is the 
ownership of animals, certainly intersects property law. 
E. Not Every Area of Law May be Capable of Definition 
As noted above, Wittgenstein observed that some terms may be used in such a 
wide variety of contexts and in so many different (but related) ways that it may be 
impossible to define these terms, in the sense in which a definition is a precise and 
accurate statement of their use.141 An area of law that a significant number of 
commentators believes may be impossible to define is environmental law. As the 
authors of a discussion that attempts to distinguish principles of environmental law 
from traditional tort doctrines observe,  
[w]hile almost universally acknowledged by courts, legal scholars, policy 
makers, and even the public as a distinct field of law, environmental law 
lacks a generally accepted definition. Rather, the label “environmental 
law” has come to encompass the universe of statutes, regulations, and 
actions at common law impacting environmental interests. These interests 
include both harm to humans from hazardous substances introduced into 
an environment, and harm to the natural habitat irrespective of direct 
injury to a person or other legally recognized entity. They may implicate a 
wide range of public policy, such as resource conservation, pollution 
control and prevention, education, scientific research, rehabilitation, 
deterrence, and corrective justice.142  
                                                            
 137 Id. at 5. 
 138 Id. at 2. 
 139 Id. 
 140 WILLIAM B. STROEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY v (3rd ed. 2000). 
 141 See WITTGENSTEIN, BLUE & BROWN, supra note 115. 
 142 Mark Latham et al., The Intersection of Tort and Environmental Law: Where the Twains 
Should Meet and Depart, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 737, 740-41 (2011). For differing definitions 
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VIII. FOLLOWING STANDARDS OF GOOD DEFINITION FURTHERS CENTRAL AIMS AND 
VALUES OF SPECIFIC AREAS OF LAW AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM IN GENERAL 
Following standards of good definition furthers central aims and values of 
specific areas of law, as well as of the legal system in general. Standards of good 
definition enable this protection of aims and values precisely because these standards 
prohibit definitions from containing or implying a great deal of specific content. 
A. Flexibility, Adaptability, and Ability to Change 
The content non-specificity of typical definitions of areas of law allows these 
areas enormous latitude regarding what substantive content they can contain at any 
given time. This in turn allows these areas—and our legal system generally—to 
adjust to and deal with new circumstances and issues. Room is allowed for new or 
modified causes of action, defenses, and remedies. In the case of tort law, for 
example, the current standard definition allowed the area to add to the early torts 
(such as assault and battery) wrongs to person and property that address more 
modern situations and problems (such as defamation and liability for the 
manufacture or sale of dangerous or defective products).143 Because the definition of 
tort law does not specify or imply the kinds of activities, instrumentalities, or objects 
with which compensable wrongs can be committed, the area has allowed for the 
application of old torts (and possibly yet to be defined torts) to situations that could 
not have been anticipated even just a few years ago, such as injuries caused by 
radioactivity, chemical pollution, or nanoparticles.144 Moreover, that the definition of 
tort law does not include only physical or economic harms allowed for the 
development of torts relating to emotional harm or distress. 
                                                            
of environmental law see, for example, Frances Irwin, The Law School and the Environment, 
12 NAT. RESOURCES J. 278, 280 (“Environmental law considers the role of law in man’s 
relationship to these surrounding systems of air, land, water, energy and life.”); Thomas 
Lundmark, Systemizing Environmental Law on a German Model, 7 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y 1, 9 (1998) (“Environmental law covers the aggregate of rules that have as their 
primary purpose the protection from anthropogenic degradation, or the restoration, of those 
resources essential to human life (atmosphere, water, and land), the prevention or 
minimization of pollution, and the conservation of components of nature, including landforms 
and forms of life not unreasonably injurious to humans.”); Alyson C. Flournoy, In Search of 
an Environmental Ethics, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 62, 64 n.2 (2003) (defining “the term 
environmental law to describe the vast realm of law, largely statutory, that addresses human 
actions affecting the rest of the natural world. Although the contours of environmental law are 
somewhat murky, most can agree that laws dealing with pollution control (including waste 
disposal and the regulation of toxic substances) form part of environmental law. I also include 
within my definition of environmental law the related field commonly known as natural 
resources law, encompassing, for example, wetlands and endangered species protection.”); 
RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 1 (2004) (“Broadly stated, 
environmental law regulates human activity in order to limit ecological impacts that threaten 
public health and biodiversity. . . . It accepts, in light of the laws of thermodynamics, that 
ecological transformation is both unavoidable and very often desirable, yet it seeks to 
influence the kind, degree, and pace of those transformations resulting from human activity.”). 
 143 See 74 AM. JUR. 2D Torts § 4 (1998); Tort Law: An Overview, LEGAL INFORMATION 
INSTITUTE, http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/tort (last visited Jan. 29, 2013). 
 144 Id. 
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B. Openness to Empirical and Normative Argument and Competing Theories of Law 
By not asserting or presupposing factual propositions about people, society, or 
issues the law may or may not need to address (such as whether many animals in 
contemporary society are exploited and abused) typical definitions of areas of law 
allow free discussion and discovery regarding different or opposing factual claims of 
legal relevance. Additionally, by not including or implying a particular analytical or 
normative theory of law, typical definitions of areas of law allow for discussion 
about what the central features and structure of these areas are or ought to be.  
C. Application of Principles Involving Multiple Areas of Law 
By not employing analytic definitions that would distinguish all instances of their 
application from all instances of the application of any other area of law, the 
definitions of some legal areas allow for kinds of overlap that our law has come to 
require. Thus, if criminal procedure and constitutional law could not, by definition, 
ever overlap, constitutional constraints could never be imposed on criminal 
procedures. If tort law could not invoke principles of property law, torts such as 
trespass to chattel and conversion, which first require that someone has a property or 
possessory right in property, could not exist.  
D. Commitment to the Adversarial Process 
The relative lack of specificity of content in definitions of areas of law also 
promotes the general commitment of our legal system to the adversarial process, in 
which parties with opposing or different claims or interests can present their 
arguments fully. Most definitions of areas of law assure this simply by not targeting 
particular parties for protection by these areas; such non-specificity allows opposing 
parties to employ the concepts and principles of these areas. Some areas of law do, 
by definition, seek to protect particular kinds of persons or interests; however, the 
definitions of these areas still allow opposing parties to employ the concepts and 
principles of these areas. The definitions of a very small number of areas of law not 
only target particular kinds of persons or interests for protection, but also restrict the 
practice of these areas to attorneys who seek to protect such persons or interests; 
however, even these areas permit the attorneys for opposing parties to utilize the 
concepts and principles of other areas of law that are not defined restrictively. 
1. Most Definitions of Areas of Law Do Not Target Particular Parties for Protection 
In recognizing a cause of action that allows a plaintiff to bring suit, an area of 
law indicates that it seeks to protect certain kinds of persons or interests. For 
example, criminal and tort law protect people from being injured or harmed in 
various ways by others. Contract law protects parties to and beneficiaries of 
enforceable agreements against others who fail to live up to these agreements. 
Although one can say that protecting potential plaintiffs involves the choice by an 
area of the law to choose the interests of some over the interests of others, this sort of 
choice is so general as to be non-specific. For in allowing certain persons (or in the 
case of criminal law, a government on behalf of its people) to become successful 
plaintiffs, the law does not presume that any particular people (or people with certain 
kinds of interests, needs, or wants) are such plaintiffs. Thus, at least ideally, no one 
becomes a convicted criminal defendant unless he violates the criminal law; anyone 
on whom a battery is inflicted may have a cause of action in tort for battery; and 
anyone who has entered into an enforceable agreement that is breached may have a 
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cause of action for breach of contract. It is therefore not helpful to say that criminal, 
tort, or contract law, for example, seek to promote the interests of one group of 
people (victims of crimes or torts or breaches of contract) against those of another 
group of people (criminals, tortfeasors, or contract-breachers). These are not groups 
that already exist independently of legal standards and that the law steps in to protect 
or disfavor; rather, people enter these “groups” if they do something that can invoke 
the law’s protection or disfavor. By having definitions that do not favor particular 
plaintiffs or defendants, criminal, tort, contract, and most other areas of law, promote 
the adversarial process by allowing both plaintiffs and defendants to fully employ 
the concepts and principles of these areas. 
2. Definitions of Areas of Law That Do Target Kinds of Parties for Protection Do 
Not Impede the Ability of Opposing Attorneys to Argue on Behalf of Their Clients  
There are some areas of law that, by definition, directly seek to protect and 
promote the interests, needs, or wants of specified individuals or groups of people 
against other individuals or groups who do or can hinder or frustrate these interests, 
needs, or wants in certain ways. Many such definitions are of areas of law that can 
be characterized as sub-fields of “anti-discrimination” or “civil rights” law, including 
age discrimination, disability civil rights, educational discrimination, employment 
discrimination, housing discrimination, pregnancy discrimination, prisoners’ rights, 
race discrimination, sex-based discrimination, sexual harassment, and voters’ rights 
law.145 However, although these areas seek to protect certain interests, their concepts 
and substantive principles subsume all relevant legal issues, and lawyers who 
represent both parties practice these areas of law. For example, sex-based 
discrimination law (and its branches of pregnancy discrimination and sexual 
harassment law) have as their definitional core the aim of protecting certain people 
from various kinds of treatment by others.146 However, in any particular lawsuit none 
of these areas favors the party who alleges that she has suffered the kinds of wrongs 
the area is defined as prohibiting. Correct application of the law to the facts of the 
case may exonerate the defendant. This is why, in a lawsuit by a plaintiff alleging 
one of these kinds of discrimination, the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s lawyers are 
both practicing sex-based, pregnancy discrimination, or sexual harassment law. 
There are a very few definitions of areas of law that not only target particular 
kinds of persons or interests for protection, but also restrict use of the name, and the 
practice of, the area to lawyers who represent those the area specifies for protection. 
However, even these definitions do not have the consequence of making it difficult 
for lawyers to represent adversaries of such people. 
The term “poverty law,” for example, is typically understood to mean the body of 
law that seeks to protect poor people, and poverty law as commonly understood is 
                                                            
 145 See Discrimination by Type, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, 
http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/index.cfm (last visited Jan. 30, 2013) (outlining various legal 
areas of discrimination).   
 146 See Aaron Larson, Sexual Discrimination Law, EXPERTLAW, http://www.expertlaw.
com/library/employment/sexual_discrimination.html (last visisted Jan. 30, 2013); Sex-Based 
Discrimination, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, http://www.eeoc.gov/
laws/types/sex.cfm (last visited Jan. 30, 2013).  
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practiced by lawyers who employ this body of law to protect such people.147 Thus, an 
attorney who sues a city for failing to keep its public housing clean and safe for 
indigent residents would be said to be practicing poverty law. However, the attorney 
representing the city would not be said to be practicing poverty law, but rather 
housing and municipal law. Importantly, the attorney representing the indigent 
residents would also be considered to be practicing housing and municipal law. That 
both attorneys are practicing and employing the principles of these same areas of law 
permits the case to be heard, for there must be concepts and substantive legal 
principles that would apply to both the plaintiffs and defendant, pursuant to which 
the dispute can be decided.  
Another example of an area of law that targets particular kinds of persons or 
interests for protection, but also restricts use of the name, and the practice of, the 
area to lawyers who represent those the area specifies for protection is women’s 
rights law. An attorney for a plaintiff suing a corporation alleging discrimination 
against women in its job promotion practices might describe herself, and be 
described by the legal profession, as engaged in the practice of “women’s rights 
law,” while the attorney representing the corporation would not be so described.148 
However, both the women’s rights lawyer and the lawyer representing the 
corporation are practicing and employing the concepts and principles of sex-based 
discrimination law, and perhaps contract, labor, and/or corporate law.  
In sum, even when definitions of areas of law do target certain kinds of persons 
or interests for protection—or reserve the practice of an area to attorneys who seek 
to protect certain persons or interests—these definitions do not impede the ability of 
parties with opposing interests to employ the adversarial process. 
IX. WHY ADVOCACY DEFINITIONS OF ANIMAL LAW SHOULD BE REJECTED  
We have considered several principles of good definition, and have examined 
how adherence to these principles by definitions of areas of law advance 
fundamental values of these areas and of the legal system generally. It can now be 
                                                            
 147 See, for example, Anthony V. Alfieri, The Antinomies of Poverty Law and a Theory of 
Dialogic Empowerment, N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 659, 661 (1987), who states that that 
“[b]y definition, the subject of poverty law is the poor. It is the poor who experience the 
objective force of poverty and the deprivation of powerlessness.” Moreover, “[t]he goal of 
poverty law should, indeed, must be the abolition of poverty.” Id. at 711. See also Stephen 
Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 YALE L.J. 1049, 1053 (“[T]he object of practicing 
poverty law must be to organize poor people, rather than to solve their legal problems. The 
proper job for a poor people's lawyer is helping poor people to organize themselves to change 
things so that either no one is poor or (less radically) so that poverty does not entail misery.”). 
 148 See Women’s Rights Law, HG.ORG: GLOBAL LEGAL RESOURCES, http://www.hg.org/
women.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2013) (describing women’s rights law as “made up of a set 
of laws, legislation and regulations enforced internationally and nationally to improve the 
wellbeing of women throughout the world”); see also Welcome and Introductions, 23 
WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 203 (2002) (explaining that “the Women's Rights Law Reporter is a 
feminist legal journal whose mission is to provide a critique of law and society through the 
lens of gender”); Who We Are, NATIONAL WOMEN’S LAW CENTER, http://www.nwlc.org/who-
we-are (last visited Jan. 30, 2013) (showing that women’s rights law largely involves 
“expand[ing] the possibilities for women and . . . advanc[ing] the issues that cut to the core of 
women's lives in education, employment, family and economic security, and health and 
reproductive rights”). 
43Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2013
934 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:891 
 
demonstrated why advocacy definition of animal law is unacceptable. This is best 
appreciated by first considering rights-centered advocacy definition. 
A. Rights-Centered Advocacy Definition Does Not Define an Area of Law  
It is a truism that any definition of an area of law must define an area of law. 
However, for a subject to be an area of law, it must be a branch or part of existing 
law. Proponents of rights-centered advocacy definition of animal law concede that 
animals do not currently have the kinds of legal rights that, according to such 
definitions, animal law seeks to establish.149 Therefore, animal law, as they define it, 
does not yet exist as an area of law. Animal law as defined by rights-centered 
advocacy definition appears to refer to either or both of the following: (1) a set of 
goals regarding how the law should (in the view of some people) deal with animals; 
(2) a group of lawyers who have certain views about how the law should deal with 
animals.150 Neither of these is an area of law. This is not a small point. It means that 
in determining what animal law is, as defined by proponents of rights-centered 
definition, one cannot examine the law, but what certain lawyers want the law to be. 
Calling a subject an “area of law,” however, implies a certain status—the status of 
something real, something already part of the law. Thus, if a law school instructor 
proposes a course on “animal law,” faculty evaluating the proposal might assume 
that the course will focus on a part or branch of the law. If it were clear that the 
course would focus on the aspirations of a segment of the legal profession regarding 
what the law should be, the course might not seem so attractive. 
B. Rights-Centered Definition Will Likely Never Define an Area of Law 
As some of the passages quoted above indicate, many proponents of rights-
centered definition of animal law, and of animal rights, appear certain that the law 
will someday adopt their views, just as the law has extended previously-denied 
rights and equality to African-Americans, women, and others. Perhaps proponents of 
rights-centered definition of animal law believe that the legal profession might as 
well adopt such definition because (in their view) it is inevitable that animals will 
eventually have fundamental legal rights. Perhaps they believe that the adoption of 
rights-centered definition will motivate the legal profession to accelerate, or at least 
accept, the inevitable.  
Our legal system, however, will never classify animals as persons, the ownership 
of which would be equivalent to slavery and the killing of which would be 
equivalent to murder. A wide range of animal uses that animal personhood would 
render illegal—including raising and killing animals for food, keeping animals in 
zoos and aquariums, and using animals in biomedical research—will not be made 
illegal. There will never, in short, be an actual area of law to which rights-centered 
advocacy definition would refer. Our economic system, key components of which 
involve the use of animals for human benefit, will not allow animals to be classified 
as persons. Ethical principles accepted by the great majority of people will not allow 
this. Deeply held religious beliefs of much of the populace will not allow this. It 
would make no sense for the legal profession to adopt a definition of an “area” of 
law that calls for legal principles that will likely never exist.  
                                                            
 149 See supra Part III.A. 
 150 Id. 
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Some readers may find my prediction about the future of animal personhood 
overly confident. I certainly cannot demonstrate the correctness of the prediction 
here. However, let us assume for purposes of discussion that the aims of proponents 
of rights-centered definition have a 25% probability of adoption by the law, indeed 
to be even more generous, a 75% probability of adoption. It would still be 
unreasonable for the legal profession to adopt a definition of animal law that might 
someday correspond to reality when a descriptive definition would now and always 
do so—no matter how the law deals with animals and even if the law should come to 
regard animals, or some animals, as persons. 
C. Rights-Centered Definition Would Exclude Many Animals from the Purview of 
Animal Law 
By including the goal of establishing legal rights that confer personhood for 
animals in its definition of “animal law,” rights-centered definition creates another 
serious problem for itself: Many animals would be excluded from the purview of 
animal law. Proponents of legal rights for animals concede that not all creatures 
commonly called “animals” qualify for such rights. Animal rights theorists disagree 
about what characteristics animals must possess to have moral and legal rights. Gary 
Francione, for example, maintains that merely the ability to suffer is sufficient to 
confer personhood and fundamental moral and legal rights on animals.151 Tom Regan 
requires more.152 Animals, he argues, must also be what he calls “subjects-of-a-life,” 
which includes “[p]erception, memory, desire, belief, self-consciousness, intention, a 
sense of the future,” as well as “emotion (e.g., fear and hatred and sentience, 
understood as the ability to experience pleasure and pain).”153 Regan opines that 
“these are among the leading attributes of normal mammalian animals aged one or 
more.”154 Steven Wise requires still more. He maintains that to have fundamental 
rights animals must possess what he calls “practical autonomy.” According to Wise, 
“a being has practical autonomy and is entitled to personhood and basic liberty rights 
if she: 1. can desire; 2. can intentionally try to fulfill her desires; and 3. possesses a 
sense of self sufficiency to allow her to understand, even dimly, that it is she who 
wants something and it is she who is trying to get it.”155 Although Wise argues that 
chimpanzees, orangutans, gorillas, and dolphins have such autonomy, he is not 
certain about dogs, for example, which he maintains have under a 0.70 probability of 
having such autonomy.156  
                                                            
 151 GARY L. FRANCIONE, INTRODUCTION TO ANIMAL RIGHTS: YOUR CHILD OR THE DOG? 
xxvii-xxx, 100-02 (2000). 
 152 REGAN, supra note 61, at 81. 
 153 Id. 
 154 Id. Regan thinks there is insufficient evidence to include fish and birds among rights-
holders, but states that “(e)ven assuming birds and fish are not subjects-of-a-life, to allow their 
recreational or economic exploitation is to encourage the formation of habits and practices that 
lead to the violation of the rights of animals who are subjects-of-a-life.” Id. at 417 n.30. 
 155 STEVEN M. WISE, DRAWING THE LINE: SCIENCE AND THE CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS 32 
(2002). 
 156 Id. at 129. 
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Francione, Regan, Wise, and all members of the animal rights movement who 
seek legal rights for animals agree that certain animals lack sufficient mental 
capacity to be given legal rights, including many species and billions of individual 
animals, such as clams, oysters, and shrimp. If Regan’s conception of “rights” is 
correct, to this list would be added birds, fish, and amphibians. If Wise is correct, 
and dogs might have to be added to the list of rightless animals based on their level 
of mental capacity, so might a whole range of other animals need to be added, 
including animals used to produce food (such as chickens, turkeys, ducks, cows, and 
pigs) and many animals used in research (such as mice, rats, hamsters, guinea pigs, 
and rabbits). 
That many animals might not be accorded legal rights by proponents of rights-
centered definition of animal law means that legal issues relating to many animals 
will not come within the purview of animal law so defined. However, these are 
animals with which the legal system deals and will want to deal (in statutes, 
regulations, litigation, and public policy). It is not clear whether proponents of 
rights-centered definition would want to recognize a different area of law that would 
deal with permanently rightless animals or would instead prefer to have existing 
areas of law deal with such animals. In any event, if, as is presumably the case, the 
legal profession would want an area of animal law that can assist lawyers in handling 
and considering the broad panoply of legal issues involving all animals (whatever 
their level of mental sophistication), even proponents of rights-centered definition 
must concede that animal law as they define it cannot constitute such an area of law. 
D. Rights-Centered Definition Violates Principles of Good Definition  
Rights-centered advocacy definition of animal law has a still more serious 
problem. Adopting such definition would violate standards of good definition and 
thereby hinder and subvert aims and values that definitions of areas of law typically 
protect.  
1. Endorsement of Empirical and Normative Propositions and Substantive Legal 
Principles 
As discussed above, it is typically not the function of a definition to settle or 
preclude argument about empirical or normative issues regarding what is defined. 
Neither lexical definitions, nor good stipulative definitions adopted to assist in 
discovery and discourse, prevent reasonable empirical or normative argument.157 By 
following this basic canon of definition, definitions of areas of law affirm that 
discussion and disagreement are important in evaluating legal principles and ensure 
that areas of law are open to development and change. 
In contrast, rights-centered definition of animal law settles and precludes a great 
deal of argument regarding how the law ought to deal with animals. For example, as 
indicated in a number of proponents’ statements of these definitions quoted above, a 
presupposition of rights-centered definition is the view that humans routinely 
mistreat many animals.158 This is why proponents of rights-centered definition assert 
that animal law, by its nature, seeks to counter this alleged mistreatment. However, 
many people disagree with this general assessment of the treatment of animals and 
                                                            
 157 See infra Parts VI.C and VI.D.2. 
 158 See supra Part III.A. 
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with more specific claims made by animal rights advocates about animal abuse and 
exploitation.159  
Rights-centered advocacy definition of animal law would also preclude, 
regarding animal law, the kinds of vigorous debates among proponents of 
instrumental and non-instrumental normative theories of law that continue with 
respect to other areas of law. By declaring that the law may not facilitate the use of 
animals for the benefit of humans generally, or for economic growth and efficiency 
in particular, rights-centered definition of animal law would impose, by definition, a 
non-instrumental theory of law for the area. It would impose a particular moralistic 
theory, which maintains that owning, using, or killing animals violates their moral 
rights.  
Indeed, the central feature of rights-centered advocacy definition—that animals 
should have legal rights—has engendered considerable controversy that would be 
foreclosed by adopting such definition. Quite a few philosophers have argued that 
the attribution of rights (moral or legal) to animals is nonsensical and incoherent 
because, in their view, having rights requires the ability to understand and claim 
these rights.160 Others maintain that rights can sensibly be accorded to some animals, 
and that some animals already have or can be given legal rights that do not preclude 
their categorization as property and do not imply that they cannot be used for a 
myriad of purposes by humans.161 Even if philosophers and legal theorists who argue 
that animals cannot (or should not) have the kinds of legal rights demanded by 
rights-centered definition of animal law are mistaken, it would surely be unwise to 
prevent them from arguing their views by declaring—by definitional fiat—that the 
law should seek to give animals rights that will, among other things, render them 
persons. This is no way to settle difficult philosophical disputes. 
In this regard, it should be noted that definitions of legal areas typically do not 
include or imply propositions that are universally accepted in society and do seem 
indisputably correct. For example, few would deny that unjustified killing or beating 
of others is morally wrong and ought to be disfavored by the law. However, the 
definitions of criminal and tort law do not include or imply the existence of causes of 
action for murder or battery.162 If definitions of areas of law do not reflect ethical and 
legal propositions that are universally accepted, surely the definition of animal law 
should not include or imply views that are widely rejected or that are at the very 
least open to legitimate questions.  
                                                            
 159 See, e.g., HAL HERZOG, SOME WE LOVE, SOME WE HATE, SOME WE EAT (2011). 
 160 For examples and defenses of this view, see Carl Cohen, The Case for the Use of 
Animals in Biomedical Research, 315 N. ENG. J. MED. 865, 865-6 (1986); H. J. McCloskey, 
Rights, 15 PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY 115, 122-27 (1965); ROGER SCRUTON, ANIMAL RIGHTS 
AND WRONGS 79-81 (3d ed. 2000); ALAN R. WHITE, RIGHTS 89-92 (1984).  
 161 For extended defenses of these two views, see JOEL FEINBERG, The Rights of Animals 
and Unborn Generations, in RIGHTS, JUSTICE, AND THE BOUNDS OF LIBERTY, supra note 35, at 
159, and JOEL FEINBERG, Human Duties and Animal Rights, in RIGHTS, JUSTICE, AND THE 
BOUNDS OF LIBERTY, supra note 35, at 185; Tannenbaum, supra note 35. 
 162 See supra Part VII.A. 
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2. Impeding Professional Development of Lawyers and Effective Representation of 
Clients 
As discussed above, areas of law bring together legal concepts and principles that 
are related in significant ways. This enables lawyers to obtain, efficiently and 
systematically, knowledge of these concepts and principles and thereby to represent 
clients effectively. For example, an attorney representing a physician in a medical 
malpractice case has at her disposal, and if she regularly defends or sues physicians 
can maintain continuing knowledge of, the field of medical malpractice law. This 
makes it unnecessary for her to begin learning afresh about relevant law before 
representing each client, nor need she research, in separate and unconnected sources, 
a large number of issues relevant to medical malpractice.  
Moreover, definitions of most legal areas do not restrict the practice of these 
areas to lawyers who represent certain kinds of clients. As observed above, the vast 
majority of areas of law (including medical malpractice law) do not target specific 
clients for protection. This allows attorneys who represent plaintiffs and defendants 
to practice these areas of law and to employ the principles of these areas. As noted 
earlier, this is also the case with areas of law (such as sex-based discrimination law) 
that do target specific people or interests for protection, but contain concepts and 
principles that all parties in litigation employ. Finally, even those very few areas of 
law (such as poverty and women’s rights law) that do restrict their practice to 
attorneys who seek to promote specified interests or parties do not actually burden 
attorneys who represent opposing interests, because these attorneys practice and 
employ more general areas of law that apply to all parties in a given dispute or 
lawsuit. 
In contrast, adoption of rights-centered definition of animal law would hinder the 
ability of some lawyers to represent clients with animal-related issues. In its 
common usage, the term “animal” is universal and all-inclusive; it refers to all 
animals. This is why, as is noted above, however it is defined, animal law likely will 
be viewed by lawyers as the area that the law designates as pertaining to all animals. 
It will therefore be this area of law that will contain and organize concepts and 
principles that lawyers representing clients regarding matters involving animals will 
want to understand and employ. Because animal law is likely to be the primary 
general area of law relating to animals, attorneys whose clients oppose the explicit 
goals and implications of rights-centered definition will need to go elsewhere in the 
law for a comprehensive and organized body of laws relating to animals. The only 
places these lawyers could go would be to already-recognized areas of law that 
contain principles that might be useful, such as criminal, housing, municipal, 
property, and tort law. Thus, these lawyers will necessarily be faced with the 
disparate, diverse, and unorganized accretion of laws relating to animals that, as I 
observed above, was the state of the law before talk arose in the 1980s about a 
distinct field of animal law.  
3. Reducing Potential Enrollments in Animal Law Courses and Attention to Animal 
Law by Law School Faculty 
Although rights-centered definition of animal law has not yet been generally 
accepted by the legal profession, there is, I would suggest, a place where such 
definition, as well as reformist advocacy definition, has gained widespread 
acceptance and where deleterious effects of such definitions can already be 
observed. This place is the country’s law schools. Animal advocacy groups and 
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lawyers commonly claim that there has been a dramatic upsurge in the interest of 
law students in animal law. An increasing number of law students and future 
lawyers, it is said, view animal law as an important subject, and their appetite for it 
is growing.163 The evidence for this claim is said to be the increase in the number of 
animal law courses taught in United States law schools.164  
I would suggest that when one looks beneath the surface of typical claims about 
the increase in the number of animal law courses, however, quite a different picture 
emerges. What I am about to say is, and presently must be, based largely on 
anecdotal evidence, including a decade of teaching animal law and conversations 
with current and former law students and faculty from a number of law schools. 
However, I am confident that careful empirical study of what is occurring at most 
law schools would confirm the following observations.  
At the great majority of law schools, there appears to be only one course in 
animal law, and at many schools this course is not offered each academic year.165 At 
most schools, enrollments in these courses are small relative to other electives. 
Reports I have received from students and faculty, and what little hard evidence is 
available, suggest that few of these courses have more than twenty students.166 At 
some law schools, full-time faculty members teach animal law, but many (and 
probably most) instructors are outside practicing attorneys who teach only animal 
law.167 It is difficult to ascertain how many animal law courses promote animal 
rights, or at the very least animal “advocacy” as understood by proponents of 
reformist advocacy definition. My estimate is that this is the case for the majority, 
and likely the great majority, of current courses.  
This estimate is supported by the fact that at many law schools, the animal law 
course is taught by a member of the ALDF, and at a number of schools the course 
was begun after a petition was presented to the administration by the school chapter 
                                                            
 163 See, e.g., Bryant supra note 50, at 247; Sankoff, supra note 17, at 106-08; Megan A. 
Senatori & Pamela D. Frasch, The Future of Animal Law: Moving Beyond Preaching to the 
Choir, 60 J. LEGAL ED. 209, 210-13 (2010); Tischler, Part II, supra note 13, at 36-7. 
 164 See, e.g., Sankoff, supra note 17. 
 165 Sankoff’s 2008 survey of animal law courses found that 53% were offered annually. Id. 
at 126. 
 166 Sankoff’s 2008 survey revealed that in animal law courses at North American law 
schools, 79% had enrollments of twenty or fewer students and 61% had enrollments of fifteen 
or fewer students. Id. at 137. Sankoff believes one explanation for these low enrollments is 
that many animal law courses are taught as seminars with enrollment caps of between twenty 
and twenty-five students. Id. at 136. However, his survey indicated that many courses had far 
fewer than twenty students. Sankoff concedes that, at least as of 2008, although the number of 
animal law courses and student interest in animal law had increased substantially, one obstacle 
to attracting students faced by instructors was “low student demand, a factor that was 
occasionally expressed as a matter of concern (e.g. ‘students don't seem interested in this 
class’), but sometimes tended to reflect a more serious problem, to wit, the lack of priority 
given to the course by the administration (e.g. ‘this course is often scheduled in a very poor 
time slot’).” Id. at 132. I suggest below that low enrollments and the low priority given to 
animal law courses by administrators are the result of the prevalence of advocacy definitions 
of animal law among law school faculty, and courses that promote animal rights or advocacy. 
 167 Sankoff’s 2008 survey found that 61% of courses in the U.S. are taught by such adjunct 
faculty. Id. at 130. 
49Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2013
940 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:891 
 
of the Student Animal Legal Defense Fund (SALDF).168 The ALDF makes clear that 
it regards these courses as furthering its general mission of “fighting to protect the 
lives and advance the interests of animals through the legal system.”169 My estimate 
that the great majority of animal law classes promote animal rights or advocacy is 
also supported by Sankoff’s 2008 survey of law school animal law courses, in which 
Sankoff states that  
[although it is impossible to chart a road map showing the precise route to 
a legal system that better protects animals . . . the development of animal 
law courses worldwide has helped give the movement a subtle push 
forward, both by increasing the quantity and quality of available legal 
research upon which to build new ideas, and by providing knowledge and 
inspiration for the “soldiers” who take up the battle.170  
According to Bruce Wagman, who has taught animal law at several law schools,  
animal law teachers have been motivated by the desire to protect innocent 
and unrepresented animals in our society just as the environmental and 
civil rights law programs were founded by lawyers who believed they had 
a mission to stop injustice in those areas. And like the significant and 
valuable precedent and legal doctrine created by those social justice 
predecessors, animal law classes bring scholarly and intellectual 
discipline and credibility to the field.171 
The question one must ask, I would suggest, is not whether there has been an 
increase in the number of animal law courses and in the total number of students 
who take these courses. The more important question is whether there would be even 
                                                            
 168 Sankoff remarks that regarding “the manner in which the animal law movement began 
in the United States, the ALDF has been a powerful force for almost two decades. . . . Early 
on, the ALDF recognized the importance of encouraging the development of animal law 
courses, and many members of the ALDF have taught them.” Id. at 131; see also How to Start 
an Animal Law Class at Your School, ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, http://aldf.org/
resources/law-professional-law-student-resources/law-students-saldf-chapters/how-to-start-an-
animal-law-class-at-your-school/ (last visited Jul. 29, 2013). 
 169 About Us, ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, http://aldf.org/about-us/ (last visited Jul. 29, 
2013). The ALDF states that it “works to protect animals” by, among other things, 
“[n]urturing the future of animal law through Student Animal Legal Defense Fund chapters 
and our Animal Law Program.” Id. The Animal Law Program “collaborates with students, 
faculty, and school administrations to facilitate the development of animal law courses and 
assists students in forming Student Animal Legal Defense Fund (SALDF) chapters.” Animal 
Law Program, ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, http://aldf.org/about-us/programs/animal-law-
program/ (last visited Jul. 29, 2013). 
 170 Sankoff, supra note 17, at 141. 
 171 Bruce A. Wagman, Growing Up with Animal Law: From Courtrooms to Casebooks, 60 
J. LEGAL ED. 193, 200-01 (2010). Wagman also thinks that what has given impetus to animal 
law courses are “the exponential increase in institutionalized animal abuse and cruelty in the 
name of human interests, causing more and more animals to suffer at greater and greater 
levels; an increased appreciation of the inner lives and consciousnesses of animals thanks to a 
growing scientific body of information establishing the undisputed similarities between 
human and animal sentiency; and an emotional response to at least the most egregious acts of 
cruelty to animals, whether deemed legal or not.” Id. at 199. 
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more courses and significantly larger enrollments if more courses did not focus on 
promoting animal rights or animal advocacy. My course in animal law at King Hall 
has been taught eight times since 2003; only other teaching duties have prevented 
my offering it annually. Enrollments have ranged from a low of twelve to a high of 
thirty-four, with an average of twenty-five students. (King Hall has approximately 
200 students in each class.) This is, I believe, a very high enrollment relative to most 
animal law courses.172 The explanation is not the pedagogical skill or personal charm 
of the instructor, but the fact that the course approaches the subject without arguing 
for or against positions on controversial issues.173 In the first class session, we 
discuss the differences between advocacy and descriptive definition of animal law, 
and I explain, always to the relief of the class, that the course adopts the latter. 
Animal rights and animal advocacy are considered, but so are arguments that reject 
animal rights and that oppose legal campaigns that have become associated with 
reformist animal advocacy. Students of all viewpoints are welcome and all 
viewpoints are considered fully—not with toleration, but with sincere respect and 
avid interest.  
Some instructors who teach animal law concede that they regard themselves as 
animal advocates, but insist that their courses are taught objectively and welcome 
students with all viewpoints.174 I have no empirical evidence to contest this claim. 
But I have absolutely no doubt that nationwide many law students (perhaps many 
hundreds) avoid animal law courses because at their schools these courses do in fact 
present themselves as training future lawyers to right the alleged horrible wrongs 
society has perpetrated on animals. In many of these courses, among the most 
prominent targets—not subjects of study, but targets to be attacked—is the legal 
status of animals as property. And although a course in animal law that adopts a 
descriptive definition of the area can be taught in a manner that actively promotes 
animal advocacy in general or animal rights in particular, a course that defines the 
area in terms of rights-centered or reformist advocacy must be taught in such a 
manner because this is how such a course conceives of the field of animal law itself. 
I know that if the animal law course at King Hall adopted a rights-centered or 
reformist advocacy definition of the area, or promoted animal rights or advocacy, 
                                                            
 172 See also supra note 166.  
 173 To be sure, students are encouraged to do so. I conceal my own views as much as 
possible to promote student discussion and debate. 
 174 See Senatori & Frasch, supra note 163, at 235-36. These authors also state, “[a]nimal 
law can be viewed as simply an area of academic study or as an important component of a 
larger social justice movement aimed at more compassionate treatment of animals. Like other 
areas of social justice study—such as women’s rights, racial inequality, disability rights, or 
environmentalism—professors of animal law often wish to improve the lives of their subject 
of study outside the classroom. That does not mean, however, that animal law professors 
should, or do, indoctrinate students with particular viewpoints.” Id. at 213. The authors appear 
to concede, however, that most students who take these courses might not need indoctrination; 
they state, “animal law courses arguably tend naturally to draw students already likely to view 
protection issues through the prism of animals’ interests, even when classes are taught from a 
neutral perspective.” Id. I respectfully submit that at least some instructors who regard animal 
law as an “important component of a larger social justice movement” and not as “simply” an 
area of “academic study,” would find it extremely difficult if not impossible to teach the 
subject from a neutral perspective—because doing so would preclude their presenting animal 
law as part of a social justice movement that seeks changes in how animals are treated.  
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there would not be sufficient interest to offer the course annually. No more than a 
third of the students who take the course would do so. I know this because the 
students tell me so. Moreover, several students have reported that friends at other 
law schools were contemplating taking the animal law course, but did not because 
the instructor made clear that the general aim of the course is to train students to 
combat the supposedly widespread unethical exploitation and abuse of animals.  
I know that enrollments in many animal law courses would increase substantially 
if these courses were taught without intent to promote animal rights or animal 
advocacy of any kind.175 It is far from clear that students who favor animal rights or 
reformist advocacy would avoid courses that are not skewed toward either of these 
approaches; such students at King Hall certainly do not. I would suggest that the 
primary responsibility of a law school that offers one course in animal law is not to 
promote animal advocacy, but to assist as many students as possible to learn about 
legal concepts and principles that may be relevant to their future practice of law and 
to their future clients.  
Many more students would also enroll in animal law courses if faculty signaled 
to students that animal-related legal issues are important in the contemporary 
practice of law. I believe that one reason many faculty members and administrators 
do not do this is that advocacy-oriented definition of the area, and rights-centered 
definition in particular, predominates among full-time law school faculty. Most 
faculty members appear to assume that animal law is animal rights law. I cannot 
count the number of faculty members at law schools who, when learning that I teach 
animal law, ask (often with bemusement, and sometimes with criticism) why I think 
that animals should be able to sue their veterinarians, that using animals in 
agriculture and biomedical research should be prohibited, and that mice and rats 
(among other animals) should be classified as persons. Many law school faculty 
members would not think of teaching a course, or trying their hand at scholarly 
work, in animal law at least in part because they flatly reject components and 
implications of rights-centered advocacy definition of the area. The result, I submit, 
is that at the great majority of law schools animal law instruction has a low priority. 
Because animal law is not widely regarded by law school faculty as something that is 
serious, useful, and important for many future lawyers to know, it is similarly 
regarded by many law students.  
E. Identical Flaws of Reformist Advocacy Definition  
The appropriate response to the deficiencies of rights-centered advocacy 
definition of animal law is not adoption of reformist advocacy definition. To be sure, 
some of the goals associated with reformist definition may be more palatable to 
                                                            
 175 My experience at King Hall contradicts Steven Wise’s assertion that law students who 
take a course in animal law “are usually those committed, however vaguely, to the idea of 
‘animal rights law.’ The course they seek is precisely one that grapples with the difficult 
moral and legal questions that surround the legal personhood of nonhuman animals and 
whether we should be able to use and abuse them as we do. Those who would prefer to see the 
law remain as it is rarely seek an animal-related class; they would prefer that it never be 
offered or that it wither away.” Wise, Casebook, supra note 69, at 257. It is inaccurate to 
claim that only courses in animal rights law can grapple with moral and legal questions 
surrounding proposed personhood for animals, or that the only alternative to seeking animal 
rights as Wise understands animal rights is preferring that the law relating to animals remains 
as it is.  
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more people than the paradigm shift envisioned by rights-centered definition. Some 
of the positions urged by proponents of reformist definition (such as better treatment 
of certain agricultural animals) may come to be adopted by the law, and perhaps 
rightly so. However, reformist definition of animal law has all the same general 
faults as rights-centered definition.  
Because the aims of proponents of reformist definition are not universally 
accepted by lawyers or their clients, animal law so-defined does not yet (and may 
never) exist. In imposing, by the definition of animal law itself, several approaches 
to various kinds of animals and animal use, reformist definition would not permit 
completely unimpeded discussion about how these animals ought to be treated. By 
requiring that all practitioners of “animal law” be opposed to certain kinds of animal 
use, reformist definition excludes from its practice lawyers and lawyers with clients 
who engage in or favor the kinds of practices that a reformist definition rejects. 
Adoption of such definition will also deprive these latter lawyers, and their clients, 
of the benefits of having an area of law that can contain and organize concepts and 
principles useful to all people who have animal-related legal issues. As discussed 
above, reformist definition of animal law can only discourage law school faculty and 
students who do not consider themselves animal “advocates” from teaching and 
taking courses in animal law. 
X. VIRTUES AND CHALLENGES OF DESCRIPTIVE DEFINITION OF ANIMAL LAW 
A. Apparent Advantages of Descriptive Definition 
It would appear that descriptive definition of animal law avoids the flaws of 
advocacy definition. By defining animal law as the area of law that deals with 
animals, a descriptive definition would assure that the area actually exists and will 
always exist as an area of law. For the law does (and will presumably always) deal 
with animals, whether or not it ever affords animals the kinds of legal rights 
demanded by rights-centered definition or adopts some of the positions of 
proponents of reformist advocacy definition. Nor would animal law, descriptively 
defined, restrict coverage of the area to issues involving animals that some people 
believe deserve special or preferred treatment or status. 
By neither including nor excluding general viewpoints or specific propositions 
about how the law does or should deal with animals, a descriptive definition would 
allow for discussion and argument about what legal concepts and principles animal 
law does, and should, include. Nor would discussion be foreclosed or hindered 
regarding an appropriate analytical or normative theory of the area. Proponents of 
legal rights and personhood for animals, for example, would be able to make their 
best arguments, as would opponents of these views.  
By not restricting the practice of animal law to attorneys who have certain 
viewpoints or represent certain kinds of clients, a descriptive definition would allow 
the area to be, or develop into, a comprehensive body of law that attorneys can use to 
effectively make a wide range of arguments and represent a wide range of clients. 
Attorneys who seek to prohibit, curtail, or regulate certain kinds of animal use would 
be able to study and employ this body of law, as would attorneys whose clients 
oppose such measures.  
By not restricting animal law to animal advocacy in general, or the promotion of 
certain legal rights in particular, a descriptive definition would indicate to law 
students with a diverse range of viewpoints about animals that the subject is relevant 
to their current and future legal interests. More law school faculty might be willing 
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to teach or support the establishment of animal law courses that give full and 
objective coverage to all points of view.  
By not restricting animal law to animal advocacy in general, or to the promotion 
of certain rights for animals in particular, a descriptive definition would mark out an 
area of law that provides the broadest possible forum for the expression of all 
manner of views about animals and how the law ought to deal with them. Those who 
advocate rights and personhood for animals would be no less welcome than those 
who seek more modest changes in how the law deals with animals, or those who 
would argue that various ways the law deals with animals should remain unchanged. 
In sum, a descriptive definition of “animal law,” unlike an advocacy definition, 
would promote, regarding animals and the law, the robust consideration and 
discussion of diverse points of view urged by John Stuart Mill in the passage quoted 
at the beginning of this Article.  
B. Potential Impediments to Formulating a Satisfactory Descriptive Definition 
1. An Analytic Definition Is Not Required 
Unfortunately, formulating a satisfactory descriptive definition of animal law 
presents a number of difficult challenges. One of these is not the fact that it might be 
impossible to find a descriptive definition that encompasses all concepts and 
principles that would be included in animal law and that excludes all concepts and 
principles that are included in other legal areas. This requirement would clearly 
make it impossible to define animal law descriptively because many areas of law 
deal with animal-related issues. However, for reasons discussed in detail above, 
many areas of law are not susceptible to analytic definition, and wisely so, so the fact 
that an analytic definition of animal law might not be possible would not itself be a 
problem. 
2. Existence of a Distinct Area of Law Capable of Definition Is Required 
However, one essential attribute of a definition of a term that denotes an area of 
law would seem to be that there is an area of law that the term denotes. I observed 
earlier that an “area” of law must have some kind of coherence that gives the area a 
recognizable character and distinguishes it from other areas.176 In recent years, 
several commentators have asked whether certain fields that are sometimes called 
areas of law have sufficient coherence and distinctiveness to be genuine areas of law. 
The question is commonly raised by asking whether a purported area has a “law of 
the horse problem.”  
This locution has been popularized by Judge Frank Easterbrook, who asks 
whether the law relating to property in cyberspace is a real area of law, or a non-
existent “area” like the imaginary field he calls “the law of the horse.” Easterbrook 
observes that “[l]ots of cases deal with sales of horses; others deal with people 
kicked by horses; still more deal with the licensing and racing of horses, or with the 
care veterinarians give to horses, or with prizes at horse shows.”177 According to 
                                                            
 176 See supra Part IV.A. 
 177 Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 
207, 207 (1996). Easterbrook attributes the locution to Dean Gerhard Casper of the University 
of Chicago Law School, id. at 207, but Easterbrook was the first to use it to discuss the 
requirement that a genuine, and teachable, area of law must have an organized and distinctive 
character. 
54https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol61/iss4/4
2013] WHAT IS ANIMAL LAW? 945 
 
Easterbrook, there are no unifying principles that connect cases that deal with 
horses.178 Anything that can be said or understood about these cases (or about how 
the law deals with horses) is adequately handled by areas of law, the coherence, 
distinctiveness, and the existence of which cannot be questioned, such as property, 
torts, and commercial transactions. Thus, Easterbrook concludes, there really is no 
distinct “law of the horse” that can be taught, studied, or practiced as such.179  
A great deal more needs to be said than is discussed by Easterbrook and others 
who have considered possible law of the horse problems of various “areas” of law 
about what constitutes sufficient coherence and distinctiveness to render something a 
genuine area of law.180 A feature Easterbrook finds critical is that the area must be 
                                                            
 178 Id. at 207-08. 
 179 Id.  
 180 Easterbrook appears to regard doctrinal content (that is, substantive concepts and rules) 
as the sole determinant of coherence and distinctiveness of a legal field. Richard Epstein 
observes that although content provides coherence and distinctiveness for some areas of law 
(primarily historically established areas traditionally taught separately in law schools), lawyers 
facing contemporary issues are sometimes required to employ doctrinal principles that cut 
across a number of traditional legal fields. It thus sometimes seems more reasonable to look 
for coherence and distinctiveness, Epstein suggests, in what lawyers do with various kinds of 
doctrinal principles and in the institutions with which lawyers deal regarding these matters, 
rather than in the principles themselves. (Epstein offers the study and practice of land 
development and finance as an example.) Richard A. Epstein, The Erosion of Individual 
Autonomy in Medical Decisionmaking: Of the FDA and IRBs, 96 GEO. L.J. 559, 560-63 
(2008). One area of law that appears to support Epstein’s view is agricultural law, which tends 
to be defined in terms not of doctrinal principles but kinds of clients and issues faced by these 
clients. See Neil D. Hamilton, The Study of Agricultural Law in the United States: Education, 
Organization and Practice, 43 ARK. L. REV. 503, 503 (1990) (defining agricultural law as “the 
study of the law’s effects upon the ability of the agricultural sector of the economy to produce 
and market food and fiber”). Hamilton observes, “there are several features of agriculture 
which make it uniquely suited as a separate area of legal study and practice. The most 
important features are the fundamental nature of the production of food to human existence, 
the extensive use of natural resources made by the sector, and the magnitude of the economic 
transactions it represents. . . . One feature that separates agricultural law from such conceptual 
topics as property law, torts, or evidence is of special significance. As a sectoral analysis, 
agricultural law starts with the economic activity of agriculture and then confronts the unique 
legal issues associated with agriculture.” Id. at 504-05. There is also a real law of the horse—
equine law—that ironically may not have a law of the horse problem because its organizing 
principles are not doctrinal but involve the area’s distinctive clientele and certain of their legal 
issues. Two prominent practitioners of this area state that “‘equine law’ really doesn’t exist as 
a separate area for the practice of law,” perhaps because they too think that doctrinal content 
determines distinctive legal areas. But they go on to indicate precisely why and how equine 
law does exist.  
Attorneys who focus their clientele on horse-owners, and would-be horse owners, use 
a combination of several specific areas of law. Such attorneys use portions of the law 
related to business formation to select the proper form of ownership for a business 
involving horses. Tax law has a bearing on the form of business ownership, 
deductions for expenses, depreciation, estate planning, etc. that horse owners may 
need to know. Attorneys use principles of contract law to describe fully an agreement 
between two or more persons or entities, whether it’s an agreement to buy or sell, to 
breed, or to board a horse. 
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useful in teaching legal issues and must be at least as useful for this purpose as 
already existing legal fields.181 By this measure, Easterbrook maintains, cyberspace 
law resembles the law of the horse. Among areas of law that commentators have 
suggested might or might not have a law of the horse problem are, in addition to 
cyberspace law,182 entrepreneurship law,183 environmental law,184 health law,185 and 
the law of globalization.186 
Easterbrook’s views present a particularly serious challenge to descriptive 
definition of animal law. Because the term “animal law” has not been used until 
recently to distinguish an area of law, in attempting a descriptive definition one 
cannot begin with the assumption that there is an area of animal law that would 
capture in a distinctive manner how the law deals with animals. For at least until 
recently, everything the law has said about animals has been said by other areas of 
law. Moreover, because these other areas have long dealt with animal-related issues, 
it might seem reasonable to suspect, at least initially, that the concepts and principles 
of these areas are adequate to deal with such issues. Additionally, animals are used 
and treated by people in a myriad of different ways. Because many kinds of animal 
use have been the subject of litigation, statutes, and regulation, the law has dealt with 
animals in an enormously wide range of different contexts and has addressed an 
enormously wide range of issues within these contexts. It might, therefore, be 
reasonable to begin any approach to defining animal law descriptively with a strong 
suspicion that if Easterbrook’s law of the horse (which would relate to only one 
species of animal) lacks sufficient coherence and distinctiveness to constitute a 
                                                            
MILTON C. TOBY & KAREN L. PERCH, EQUINE LAW: YOUR GUIDE TO HORSE HEALTH CARE AND 
MANAGEMENT 6 (1999) (emphasis added); see also Joan S. Howland, Let’s Not “Spit the Bit” 
in Defense of “The Law of the Horse”: The Historical and Legal Development of American 
Thoroughbred Racing, 14 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 473, 475 (2004) (claiming that equine law 
does not have a law of the horse problem but maintaining that in any event it is useful to 
distinguish and consider the law of thoroughbred horse racing).  
 181 Easterbrook, supra note 177, at 207-08.  
 182 See also Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 
HARV. L. REV. 501 (1999) (rejecting Easterbrook’s contention that cyberlaw has a law of the 
horse problem).  
 183 See Darian M. Ibrahim & D. Gordon Smith, Entrepreneurs on Horseback: Reflections 
on the Organization of Law, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 71, 76 (2008) (arguing that entrepreneurship 
law avoids a law of the horse problem because it involves a “discrete factual setting [that] 
generates the need for distinctive legal solutions”). Contra Benjamin Means, Foreword: A 
Lens for Law and Entrepreneurship, 6 OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 1 (2011).  
 184 See infra note 197.  
 185 See, e.g., Wendy K. Mariner, Toward an Architecture of Health Law, 35 AM, J.L. & 
MED 67, 86 (2009) (“Health law is an eclectic and integrated translegal field, drawing on 
multiple domains of law to create an identifiable applied field of law. It applies and adapts 
existing law to protect health within the constraints of justice and human rights.”). 
 186 See Harold Hongju Koh, Is There a “New” New Haven School of International Law?, 
32 YALE J. INTL. L. 559, 572 (“While sometimes derided as the proverbial ‘Law of the Horse,’ 
one of the analytic challenges facing the law of globalization is asking whether there is ‘in fact 
a distinctive, emerging law of which topics like human rights and international business 
transaction are a part.’”).  
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discrete area of law, so might animal law (which would presumably deal with all 
animal species). 
Whether any purported area of law has sufficient coherence and distinctiveness 
to qualify as a genuine area of law cannot be deduced simply from its definition. 
Because definitions of areas of law typically contain minimal substantive content, 
one cannot expect that the definition of an area will state or imply its unifying and 
distinguishing principles and organization. Determining whether animal law defined 
descriptively would have a law of the horse problem requires careful examination of 
its content and organization, which is beyond the scope of this Article. However, 
although definitions of areas of law might not capture their coherence and 
distinctiveness, the definition of an area can indicate that the area might have a law 
of the horse problem. This may well be the case with descriptive definitions of 
animal law. 
The problem can be appreciated by considering the following possible 
descriptive definitions of “animal law,” and how these definitions would apply to a 
range of animal-related scenarios presented in the Table at the end of this Article.187 
A. Animal law is the area of law that deals with (or synonymously 
pertains to, relates to, or involves) animals. 
 
B. Animal law is the area of law that affects (or synonymously impacts or 
has an impact on) animals.188 
 
C. “Animal Law brings together statutes and cases from multiple fields of 
law that consider, at their core, the interests of animals or the interests of 
humans with respect to animals.”189 
 
D. “Animal law is, in its simplest (and broadest) sense statutory and 
decisional law in which the nature—legal, social, biological—of 
nonhuman animals is an important factor.”190 
 
E. “All law is animal law. Animal law cuts across virtually every 
substantive area of the law, including tort, contract, property, family, 
                                                            
 187 The scenarios in the Table, although representative of kinds of animal-related issues, are 
entirely fictional and not intended to represent actual cases or situations. It is important to note 
that the Table illustrates only a minuscule fraction of animal-related legal issues. If, as I argue, 
just the scenarios in the Table indicate that formulating a descriptive definition of animal law 
will be challenging, a larger and more representative sample of animal-related legal issues will 
likely provide even more compelling evidence of the difficulty of the task. 
 188 See Duckler & Campbell, supra note 84, at 15 (“Innumerable local, state and federal 
statutes and regulations that affect the welfare, use and abuse, sale and management, 
protection and killing of animals are all part of animal law.”); EISENSTEIN, supra note 86, at 8 
(stating that animal law “is law, legal precedent, rules, and regulations that affect animals’ 
care and use, how they can and cannot be treated, and even whether or not they are considered 
animals”). 
 189 FRASCH ET AL., NUTSHELL, supra note 45.  
 190 FRASCH ET AL., ANIMAL LAW, supra note 55, at xvii. 
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taxation, trust and estates, insurance, criminal, administrative, 
international, and environmental.” 191 
Definition A is the broadest possible descriptive definition; animal law in this 
sense would include any legal concept or principle (including anything in decisional, 
statutory, and regulatory law) that relates in some way to animals. Definition A is 
unsatisfactory because it would include in animal law some issues that would be 
viewed as being solely within the province of other areas and not of “animal law” as 
most lawyers would likely understand the term. All the scenarios in the Table deal 
with or involve animals. However, some seem not to relate to animal law, and the 
legal principles they involve could be (and sometimes have been) nicely taught in 
courses in other areas of law.  
One would likely not say that Scenario 1, for example, involves or applies 
principles of animal law.192 This is a tort case in which an animal plays an important 
role. To be sure, among the central issues in the lawsuit will be whether, in light of 
how dogs behave, it was possible under all the circumstances for an ordinarily 
reasonable and prudent driver to have been able to see the dog and avoid A’s car. 
But the case does not involve any distinctive legal principles relating to animals or 
dogs. Likewise, Scenario 3 appears to involve solely tort law. The dispute in 
Scenario 6 seems essentially a matter of contract law, and not animal law, even 
though the legal principle that dogs are property that can, under certain 
circumstances, be bought and sold might be regarded as part of animal law, and even 
though in her lawsuit E may want to invoke facts about dogs in general or the 
particular dog she contracted to purchase to argue that she should not be compelled 
to accept a different animal. Scenario 9 appears to be a matter of environmental law 
and 11 a matter of tort law. Veterinarians diagnose and treat animals. But the 
standard of care that would be applied in Scenario 13 (performing as would the 
ordinarily reasonable and prudent practitioner) is the same general standard that is 
applied to physicians,193 and thus arguably belongs to tort law, health care provider 
law, or perhaps the more specific areas of veterinary or veterinary malpractice law. 
Scenario 18 seems to raise issues in food and perhaps agricultural law. 
Definition B is somewhat more restrictive than Definition A because not 
everything that relates to animals can be said to “affect” or “impact” animals. The 
dog in Scenario 1, for example would not be affected by how the law would resolve 
this dispute. However, the application of legal principles in most of the other 
scenarios in the Table (including some already noted that would not be included in 
animal law) would or could in some manner “affect” either the particular animals in 
these scenarios or other animals in similar circumstances. 
Definition C has two major defects. As discussed above, good definitions 
generally (and definitions of areas of law in particular) avoid significant 
controversies regarding what is defined. There is disagreement among philosophers 
                                                            
 191 Schaffner & Fershtman, supra note 85, at xxxv. 
 192 The particular facts of this and the other numbered scenarios discussed below are 
related in the accompanying Table. 
 193 78 AM. JUR. 2D Veterinarians § 7 (2012) (observing that “[t]he broad basis of liability of 
a veterinarian is to be tested by the rules with respect to what is ordinary care and the lack 
thereof, as they are applied to physicians and surgeons generally”).  
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about whether it is appropriate to say that some or all animals have “interests.”194 
More importantly, saying that animal law “considers” the “interests of humans with 
respect to animals” renders Definition C identical in application to Definition A. 
Because the law is a human institution, it is hard to imagine any legal principle 
relating to animals (or anything else) that does not, in some way, express or affect 
the interests of some humans. Thus, Definition C boils down to defining animal law 
as the entire body of laws relating to animals. 
Definition D is unhelpful, and not just because it requires further explanation of 
what is understood by the “legal,” “social,” and “biological” “nature” of animals—
terms the meaning of which are not clear on their face. In any ordinary sense, just the 
“biological nature” of the animals is an “important factor” in all the scenarios in the 
Table, some of which (as already noted) do not appear to involve animal law. For 
example, dogs are involved in automobile accidents because many have a natural 
tendency to escape or roam, and are valued as companions because of their ability to 
interact in significant ways with humans; animal species can become endangered 
because the biological nature of their members cannot always sustain challenges 
from humans, other animals, or the environment; and it is the biological nature of 
pigs and other animals that causes them to excrete waste that can become nuisances 
or environmental threats.  
Finally, in stating that animal law “cuts across virtually every substantive area of 
the law,” Definition E clearly does not exclude, at least without further 
characterization, issues that would not be included in animal law. 
The scenarios in the Table also indicate why it may be difficult to formulate any 
descriptive definition of animal law that reflects what most lawyers would be 
inclined to regard as belonging to the area and that avoids a law of the horse 
problem. Some of the scenarios present situations that, I would suggest, many 
lawyers might indeed be inclined to regard as involving concepts and principles of 
animal law.195 However, some of these same scenarios also appear to involve 
another area of law at least as much as animal law. These include Scenarios 2 (torts, 
remedies); 4 (criminal law); 5 (wildlife law); 7 (contract, landlord-tenant law); 8 
(municipal, public health law); 10 (agricultural law); 12 (veterinary law); 14 
(education law); 15 (estate and trust law); 16 (wildlife, constitutional, tort law); 17 
(administrative law); and 19 (intellectual property, patent law).  
As discussed above, some issues are covered concurrently by more than one area 
of law. However, even when this is the case, it is usually possible to determine that a 
given principle belongs to a particular area of law. For example, while a rule of 
criminal procedure mandated by constitutional law is also a rule of criminal 
procedure, we can say that the rule derives essentially from constitutional law. If the 
scenarios listed in the previous paragraph involve another area (or more than one 
other area) at least as much as they would involve animal law, animal law might lack 
a sufficiently strong character and identity to distinguish it from those other areas. If 
                                                            
 194 See, e.g., McCloskey, supra note 160 (arguing that “interests” are matters that ought to 
be of concern to a being that has them, and that although various things can affect an animal’s 
welfare, one cannot say that an animal ought to feel or do anything). Contra REGAN, supra 
note 61, at 87-88 (arguing that animals have an “interest” in whatever is beneficial to their 
welfare). 
 195 I do not contend that all these scenarios should, after due consideration, be regarded as 
of concern to animal law, but only that many lawyers would be inclined to so regard them. 
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animal law must give way (so to speak) to some other area of law in a large and 
widely diverse range of situations in which the law deals with animals, animal law 
would not seem to contain much substance—or at the very least would not appear to 
be an area of law that would be necessary or even useful in dealing with the wide 
range of animal-related issues the law considers.  
Moreover, even when it might seem reasonable to regard certain issues to be of 
concern to animal law, it is far from obvious what general principle or principles 
would explain why legal approaches to these issues would help to demarcate a 
distinct area of animal law. Among the topics raised by scenarios in the Table that, 
some might argue, would be of concern to animal law are practices and behavior that 
relate to the following: the welfare of animals (Scenarios 5, 10, 12, 15, 16, 17); 
public health and safety (Scenarios 3, 8, 12, 17, 18); economic interests certain 
people have in animals (Scenarios 6, 10, 12, 17, 18, 19); emotional attachments and 
interests certain people have in animals (Scenarios 2, 7, 15, 16); activities involving 
animals that are important to people for esthetic, life-style, or ethical reasons 
(Scenarios 5, 8, 14, 17); and potential personal injury or property damage caused by 
animals (Scenarios 2, 8, 17, 18). It is not immediately apparent what connects these 
topics as they are exemplified in just the scenarios in the Table, in a way or ways 
that would assist in delineating a single, unified, and coherent area of law. 
C. The Tasks Ahead 
1. Attempting to Find a Satisfactory Descriptive Definition 
Proposing a satisfactory descriptive definition of animal law is beyond the scope 
of this Article. Framing such a definition will require careful study of the many and 
diverse legal concepts and principles the law has employed (or might employ) to 
deal with animals, and the extent to which lawyers and courts want to subsume these 
concepts and principles under the rubric of “animal law.” It is possible that a 
descriptive definition that reflects what lawyers would be inclined to include in 
animal law (and that might avoid a law of the horse problem) will involve 
determining what, in the enormous and growing mass of legal material relating to 
animals, the great majority of lawyers will find useful to organize in one body of 
law. Perhaps the profession will choose to adopt a stipulative descriptive definition 
of animal law that would select some, and exclude other, issues and principles that 
pertain to animals. Or perhaps it will prove useful to eschew general talk of “animal 
law” altogether, and to distinguish with stipulative definitions a number of more 
limited areas that deal with particular kinds of issues relating to animals.196  
2. Dealing with the Possibility That a Descriptive Definition Is Unachievable 
It is also possible that sustained efforts will not result in a precise, clear, and 
useful descriptive definition of animal law. It might prove to be impossible to 
characterize animal law as an area with a coherent and distinctive identity. However, 
                                                            
 196 See supra Part VI.D.2. For example, it might be useful to distinguish separate areas of 
animal research, animal welfare, companion animal, entertainment and performance animal, 
equine, food and farm animal, and wildlife law. These are only some possibilities. There has 
already been some recognition of distinct areas of equine law, see supra note 180, and wildlife 
law. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. BEAN & MELANIE J. ROWLAND, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL 
WILDLIFE LAW (3d ed. 1997); ERIC T. FREYFOGLE & DALE D. GOBLE, WILDLIFE LAW: A 
PRIMER (2009); THOMAS A. LUND, AMERICAN WILDLIFE LAW (1978).  
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it is far better to have an indefinable “area” of animal law with a law of the horse 
problem, than to accept the deleterious consequences of advocacy definitions. 
Lawyers and clients would still benefit from increased interest by the general 
profession in animal-related legal issues and from robust debate about how the law 
should deal with animals in various situations. Such benefits might be 
accomplished—perhaps even spectacularly—even if animal law is incapable of 
definition or of having, or developing, a coherent and unique character. To be sure, it 
might then be more appropriate to title courses and texts something like “animals 
and the law” or “animal-related legal issues” rather than “animal law.” But courses, 
texts, and bar association committees could still serve as a repository and forum for 
consideration of important legal concepts and principles relating to animals. More 
lawyers could still become better educated about animal-related legal issues and 
better able to represent clients with animal issues.  
That animal law might accomplish such benefits even if it is incapable of 
definition or of having, or developing, a coherent and unique character is supported 
by the area of environmental law. As observed above, scholars have thus far been 
unable to reach agreement on a definition of environmental law.197 Moreover, some 
commentators believe a satisfactory definition may never be found precisely 
because, in their view, environmental law is not a coherent and distinctive field.198 
This has not, however, prevented a large number of attorneys from practicing 
“environmental law,” the existence of many popular law school courses, and a large 
and growing scholarly literature. If environmental law can be home to so much 
interesting, vigorous, and important inquiry and argument, so might a perhaps 
indefinable and indistinct “area” of animal law. 
XI. CONCLUSION: A NECESSARY FIRST STEP 
An accurate and useful descriptive definition of animal law, if one is to be found, 
likely must await general acceptance by lawyers of the need for descriptive 
definition of the area. Once the profession appreciates why advocacy definition is 
                                                            
 197 See supra Part VII.E. 
 198 See Elizabeth Fisher et al., Maturity and Methodology: Starting a Debate About 
Environmental Law Scholarship, 21 J. ENVTL. L. 213, 219 (2009) (stating that environmental 
law is inherently “incoherent,” meaning “that the subject has no single guiding logic, no 
overarching doctrinal framework or no ‘constitutional’ grounding. . . . [M]uch ink has been 
spilled attempting to define the boundaries of the subject as if this exercise will bring with it 
intellectual coherence. Despite the effort, no definitive definition of the subject has been 
forthcoming.”). Contra Jay D. Wexler, The (Non)Uniqueness of Environmental Law, 74 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 260, 316 (2006) (concluding that “[e]nvironmental law addresses a unique set 
of problems and seeks to protect a unique set of resources, and those facts alone suffice to set 
the field apart as an area of inquiry and study”). For discussions that admit apparent lack of 
unity and coherence in environmental law but propose different ways finding structure in the 
disorder, see Todd S. Aagaard, Environmental Law as a Legal Field: An Inquiry in Legal 
Taxonomy, 95 CORNELL L.REV. 221 (2010); Robert L. Fischman, The Divides of 
Environmental Law and the Problem of Harm in the Endangered Species Act, 83 IND. L. J. 
661 (2008); Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Environmental Law and Three Economies: Navigating a 
Sprawling Field of Study, Practice, and Societal Governance in Which Everything is 
Connected to Everything Else, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L.REV. 359 (1999); A. Dan Tarlock, Is There 
a There There in Environmental Law?, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 213 (2004); David A. 
Westbrook, Liberal Environmental Jurisprudence, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 619 (1994).  
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unacceptable and recognizes that a good descriptive definition is lacking, more work 
will likely be done in attempting to formulate such a definition, and legal scholars 
may be more motivated to seek coherence, organization, and distinctiveness in 
animal law.  
Animals and their use play an enormous role in society. Law students and 
lawyers should therefore understand that animal-related legal issues are not of 
interest only to a relative few or only to people with certain views about animals, but 
are important to anyone who is affected by such issues, which is virtually everyone. 
Adequate attention by the profession to animal-related issues, however, will not be 
guaranteed by rejection of advocacy definitions of animal law or even by the 
formulation and general endorsement of a satisfactory descriptive definition. By its 
nature, a descriptive definition (or at the very least rejection of advocacy definition) 
would be neutral regarding how the law, lawyers, and law schools ought to deal with 
animals. A law school instructor could espouse a descriptive definition (or disavow 
advocacy definition) and still teach a course that is aimed at training advocates for 
animal rights or other causes. A bar association animal law section could espouse a 
descriptive definition, but devote its efforts to animal rights or reformist advocacy. 
Even if animal law comes to be universally defined by the legal profession in a 
descriptive manner, many lawyers, law faculty, and law students might still avoid 
the area if in fact it remains associated with viewpoints regarding animals that many 
clients of lawyers, and many lawyers themselves, reject.  
Rejection of advocacy definition of animal law will not by itself result in 
widespread interest among lawyers in animal issues. However, such interest will 
never occur if lawyers begin, as many still do, with a definition of animal law that 
requires promotion of animal rights or other kinds of animal advocacy. The first 
order of business, then, must be rejection of advocacy definitions of animal law. 
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TABLE: SOME ANIMAL-RELATED LEGAL SCENARIOS 
1. The driver (A) of an automobile sues the driver (B) of another car for 
negligence. A and B were traveling in opposing lanes of traffic on a two-lane road 
when B swerved into A’s lane after a dog darted from the sidewalk on B’s side of 
the road in front of B’s vehicle. B’s car struck A’s vehicle head-on causing A to 
suffer serious physical injuries, for which A is suing B for compensation. 
 
2. Driver B in Scenario 1 hit the dog as well as driver A’s car, and the dog died 
as a result. The owner (C) of the dog sues B for negligently killing the dog, demands 
compensation for the economic value of the animal, and asks the court to allow her 
also to sue for the emotional distress she has suffered as a result of the dog’s death. 
 
3. Before the accident that is the subject of Scenarios 1 and 2, while the dog was 
roaming through the neighborhood it attacked two children who were playing in 
their front yard. The parents of the children are suing C, on behalf of the children, for 
compensation for the costs incurred in obtaining medical care for them and for the 
children’s pain and suffering caused by the attack. 
 
4. After the accident that is the subject of Scenarios 1 and 2, local authorities 
learned from neighbors of C that C routinely failed to provide the dog with adequate 
food and water and periodically beat it when it roamed from C’s property. C has 
been charged with the crime of cruelty to animals. 
 
5. The Department of Fish and Game of State S has issued new regulations 
concerning the hunting of deer in the state, including when in the year hunting is 
permissible; what weapons may be used; and limitations on the age, gender, and size 
of deer that can be taken. The regulations are intended to maintain a sustainable deer 
population for hunting and to assure that deer are killed humanely. 
 
6. A breeder (D) of Dalmatian and Akita dogs signed a contract with purchaser 
(E) for $2,000 for the sale of a Dalmatian puppy that E selected from a litter. D 
received a check from E and agreed to keep the puppy for a week. When E arrived to 
pick up the puppy on the agreed-upon date, she was told by D that the puppy had 
been sold the previous day to someone else, that D had already deposited E’s check 
on the day she had received it, but that E could have another puppy from the same 
litter for no extra money. E sues D demanding either the puppy she contracted to 
purchase or return of her money. 
 
7. E lives in an apartment pursuant to a lease that prohibits possession by any 
tenant of more than one dog. E depends on the one dog she now has for love and 
companionship and wanted to purchase the Dalmatian puppy from D because her 
current dog is elderly and she wants to prepare for the time when this dog will die. E 
has been told by the apartment building manager that eviction proceedings will be 
instituted against her should she keep a second dog in her apartment.  
 
8. The city in which D lives and breeds her dogs has enacted an ordinance 
prohibiting the possession of Pit Bulls, Rottweilers, Akitas, and Chows within city 
limits. The City Council stated that the ordinance is intended to protect people in the 
city from attacks by dogs of these breeds.  
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9. After the discovery of a hitherto-unknown species of field mouse in Town Q, a 
suburb of a large city, the United States Department of Interior classified the species 
as endangered, pursuant to the federal Endangered Species Act (ESA). The 
Department has stated that any future construction of houses in the area designated 
as the habitat of the endangered mouse would constitute an unlawful taking of the 
animals pursuant to the ESA. 
 
10. The voters of State S have passed a referendum prohibiting pig farmers from 
keeping pregnant sows in gestation cages (in which the pigs are prevented from 
movement other than getting up and lying down). The law was described in the 
initiative as intended to protect the welfare of pigs used in agriculture in the state.  
 
11. The owner of a private residence adjacent to a pig farm in State S has sued 
the owner of the farm for nuisance, demanding that the farm be closed and seeking 
monetary compensation because of the foul smells that emanate from the pigs’ 
waste. 
 
12. The veterinary licensing board in State S has issued regulations governing the 
behavior of veterinary practitioners pursuant to the State’s veterinary medicine 
practice act. Some of these regulations relate to protecting the interests of veterinary 
clients and the public and others to protecting the welfare of veterinary patients. 
Among the regulations aimed at protecting clients and the public is a requirement 
that veterinarians perform all services for which they are paid and a prohibition 
against providing controlled substances to humans for their use. 
 
13. A dairy farmer has sued his veterinarian for negligently killing one of his 
milking cows. The amount of the client’s economic loss because of the animal’s 
death is not in dispute. The only issues are whether the veterinarian’s treatment of 
the cow was negligent and whether any such negligence caused the animal’s death 
and the client’s loss. 
 
14. A veterinary student has sued the veterinary school she is attending to permit 
her to graduate without taking a required course that students fail unless they 
euthanize a dog after they have performed various surgical procedures on it.  
 
15. A lawyer writes a trust document that provides for the care of testator T’s 
dogs and cats after T’s death. 
 
16. An animal activist group held a protest during a deer hunt in State S, in which 
members of the group ran through the woods during the hunt, making noises to 
chase off the deer and yelling insults at the hunters. Several hunters have sued the 
individuals who disturbed the hunt demanding a court injunction to prohibit them 
from disrupting their hunting in the future. 
 
17. The Horse Racing Board of State S has adopted new restrictions on the use of 
specified pain-killing and performance-enhancing drugs in horses for seventy-two 
hours prior to races. The restrictions are intended to protect the horses from 
breakdowns during races caused by the masking of underlying medical issues, to 
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protect jockeys riding horses during races from injury, and to assure that racetrack 
patrons who bet on horses have a fair chance of success. 
 
18. Biotech Company X has inserted the gene of a cactus plant into cattle, 
thereby producing animals whose meat has more protein and less fat than the meat of 
ordinary cattle. X is asking the United States Food and Drug Administration to allow 
it to breed and market the animals to cattle ranchers, based on tests conducted by X’s 
scientists showing that the meat is safe for human consumption. 
 
19. Company X has filed a patent application for the genetically modified cattle. 
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